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Legal Aspects of Prior Informed
Consent on Access to Genetic
Resources: An Analysis of Global
Lawmaking
and
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ABSTRACT

Since the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has
been in force, national implementation of the access to and
benefit-sharing(ABS) requirement on genetic resourceshas been
flourishing. A requirement of prior informed consent (PIC) by
the people controlling access to genetic resources constitutes a
major instrument to deter illegal bioprospecting and to ensure
fair access to genetic resources.
This Article aims to analyze the continuing global
lawmaking on PIC and to conduct a comparative study on how
genetically rich nations implement the PIC requirement with a
view to examining whether the genuine mandate of the CBD has
been fulfilled.
This Article argues that the will of local indigenous
communities should be respected, regardlessof whether they are
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entitled to give consent. Further, national operation of PIC
should be under an adequate international supervision to
prevent the misuse or abuse of PIC and to ensure that
implementation of PIC conforms to the CBD objectives.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONSOLIDATION OF INTERNATIONAL
MOVEMENTS TO CONTROL GENETIC RESOURCES

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 1 provides that
genetic resources (GR) originate in plants, insects, animals, and
microbes. 2 As a result, human genes are practically excluded from
the definition of GR. The value and significance of GR has become
increasingly prominent in recent years, playing a significant role in
the spheres of agriculture, bio-industries, and medicine, as well as the
global economy. 3 Notably, the modern biotechnology industry
4
substantially relies on bioresources to produce commercial products.
Prior to the adoption of the CBD, there had been a push to place
GR under international control so that the benefits of GR would be
available or accessible to all humankind instead of being dominated
by each sovereign nation alone. 5 The effort of the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to preserve agricultural
genetic resources represents a leading model in the movement to
classify GR as international common property. 6 The International
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, 7 adopted in 1983, cites as
its basis "the universally accepted principle that plant genetic
resources are a heritage of mankind and consequently should be
available without restriction." In an earlier stage, the text aimed to

1.
Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79
[hereinafter CBD].
2.
The CBD defines GR as "genetic material" of actual or potential value, and
considers genetic material to be "any material of plant, animal, microbial or other
origin containing functional units of heredity." Id. art. 2.
3.
See generally GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE
AND BIODIVERSITY 1 (2000) [hereinafter DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS]

(stating that plant GR have incalculable value to agriculture, human welfare, and the
world economy and that plant GR are perhaps the most important category of
biological resources); GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOGENETIC
RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 18-20 (2004) [hereinafter DUTFIELD,

BIOGENETIC RESOURCES] (discussing the commercial importance of biogenetic resources
and

traditional

knowledge);

MITSUO

MATSUSHITA

ET

AL.,

THE

WORLD TRADE

ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY 413 (2003) (describing the impact of Article
15 of the Convention of Biological Diversity on access to genetic resources).
4.
Michael I Jeffery, Bioprospecting: Access to Genetic Resources and BenefitSharing Under the Convention on Biodiversity and the Bonn Guidelines, 6 SING. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 747, 754-55 (2002).
5.
U.N. Food & Agricultural Organization [F.A.O.] Conference, 22nd Session,
Nov. 23, 1983, International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, art. 1, F.A.O.
Conference Res. 8/83, U.N. Doc. C/83JRep., available at http://www.fao.org
/ag/cgrfa/lU.htm [hereinafter Undertaking].
6.
Id. art. 7.
7.
Id. art. 1.
8.
Id.
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ensure that GR would not be monopolized by the private sector but
would benefit all humans. 9 The designation of GR as a part of the
common heritage of mankind (CHM) would help reduce national
control of GR and thus make the resources more easily accessible. 10
The idealistic equation of GR with CHM notwithstanding, it is
difficult to vindicate the universal prevalence of the move,
particularly in light of current developments.
First of all, the
Undertaking, which is soft law in nature, is not a legally binding
instrument. Secondly, the notion of equating GR with CHM has
hardly been practiced by either developed or developing nations.
Developed countries initially expressed reservation to the idea
promoted by the Undertaking." It is also clear that the doctrine of
global genetic commons is no longer honored, even by the developing
world. Rather, developing countries have already been inclined to
argue that GR should be under sovereign domain and to favor a
strong and effective national regulation of GR access within national
boundaries.1 2 Third, the global commons of GR would meet with
difficulties in its management. Given that most GR, apart from those
located under the high seas, 13 are within certain countries'
boundaries, the internationalization of GR would certainly encounter
resistance from GR-providing nations.
The tendency during recent decades has been to shift from the
global commons approach to GR to the sovereign dominance
approach.
In particular, developing countries continue to voice
intolerance and resentment toward biopiracy and misappropriation of
their GR. 14 These nations consider tighter regulation of GR access

9.
Jeffery, supra note 4, at 758 n.58 (further observing the failure of the
Undertaking to achieve its primary purpose).
10.
Atul Kaushik, The Indian Experience in the Field of IPRs, Access to
Biological Resources and Benefit Sharing, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 255, 256 (Christophe Bellmann
et al. eds., 2003); see also Sabrina Safrin, Hyperownership in a Time of Biotechnology
Promises: The InternationalConflict to Control the Building Blocks of Life, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 641, 644-45 (2004) (tracing the transition from common ownership of genetic
information to more restricted ownership).
ii.
Safrin, supra note 10, at 644 n.15.
12.
Jeffery, supra note 4, at 759.
13.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 136, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (designating the resources of the sea bed as
the common heritage of mankind).
14.
Biopiracy means "the unauthorized, uncompensated removal of genetic
resources from a source country." See Jeffery, supra note 4, at 757, n.53 (defining
biopiracy in the context of regulation). Developing countries have endeavored to revoke
bad patents that were granted as a result of biopiracy. See also Kuei-Jung Ni, The
Incorporationof the CBD Mandate on Access and Benefit-Sharing into TRIPS Regime:
An Appraisal on the Appeal of Developing Countries with Rich Genetic Resources, 1
ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. AND POL'Y 433, 437-38 (2006) (discussing cases of
biopiracy harming countries with rich genetic resources and such country's attempts to
revoke bad patents obtained by biopiracy). See generally DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL
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and fair benefit sharing to be essential in preventing the injustice of
biopiracy and assuring equity in bioprospecting.
The conclusion of the CBD in 1992 echoed the call for proper
control of GR mainly by requiring a fair and equitable sharing of GR
interests as one of its three objectives. 15 Concerning its authority and
competence to regulate GR access, the CBD confers power to
contracting parties while reaffirming the sovereign rights of states
17
over GR. 16 Though skepticism toward the CBD mandate remains,
the sovereign control of GR is arguably a reflection of customary
international environmental law. 18 Further, given the worldwide
accession to the CBD 19 and the irreplaceable function of national
governments in this regard, national authority has already played a
crucial role in regulating GR.
More importantly, the CBD stipulates the regime of access to
and benefit sharing (ABS) of GR.2 0 The prior informed consent (PIC)
requirement, borrowed from a restriction on doctors' ability to treat

PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 65-67 (stating that developing countries want to

stop biopiracy of their CR).
CBD, supra note 1, art. 1 (describing the other two objectives of the CBD as
15.
"the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components").
CBD, supra note 1, art. 15(1).
16.
See generally Safrin, supra note 10, at 647-48 (discussing developing
17.
countries' concern that profits from genetic material were flowing to developed
countries because of the Undertaking).
It has become a customary rule of international environmental law that
18.
states are entitled to claim sovereign rights on natural resources within their
jurisdiction. See PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 112-14 (2d ed. 2002). Numerous international documents on the
environment have confirmed the rule. E.g., U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment, June 5-16, 1972, Declarationof the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, U.N. Doc. AICONF.48114/Rev.1 (Jan. 1, 1973), reprinted in 11
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1416 (1972) (noting that Principle 21 mandates that nations
ensure that their environmental exploitation remains limited to their borders); U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declarationon
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) (Jan. 1, 1993)
(stating that Principle 2 obligates nations to assume responsibility for their
environmental exploitation or protection); UNCLOS, supra note 13, arts. 56, 77
(recognizing the sovereign rights of states relating to their Exclusive Economic Zone
and Continental Shelf).
As of October 2008, the Convention on Biological Diversity had 191
19.
contracting parties. See Convention on Biological Diversity, List of Parties,
http://www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (pointing out that the
U.S. and Taiwan are the only two major nations that are not contracting parties to the
CBD).
Since the adoption of the CBD, the CBD has set up an ad hoc, open-ended
20.
working group to address the detailed content of ABS with a view to strengthening
ABS function. See Convention on Biological Diversity, Access and Benefit-Sharing
Introduction, http://www.cbd.int/abs/intro.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2009). Today, the
ABS regime in general has been implemented by many countries as a useful
mechanism to maintain fair and equitable access to GR and to deter biopiracy.
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patients, 21 is incorporated into ABS. A PIC requirement that obliges
GR users to seek consent from GR providers before accessing the
resources in question may reduce the effects of biopiracy and
unchecked bioprospecting that disrespect the free will of GR
providers. The mechanism can also ensure 'fair access' to GR. Most
national legislatures use PIC as a core element and condition of the
22
approval of applications for GR access.
A variety of national and international stakeholders are
interested in GR access; it is essential to take their interests into
account in implementing the PIC mandate. Local GR providers,
indigenous peoples, and local communities should be allowed to voice
their concerns on any access project because GR in their territories
23
are often integral components in their traditional life and culture.
Bioprospecting researchers and companies have an interest in GR
exploration because the value of GR can hardly be realized or
commercialized without the use of their advanced biotechnology. 24 In
effect, they may assert that the freedom of bioprospecting and
research should be recognized, and they oppose unnecessary
restrictions on GR exploration. 25 Of course, as major and dominant
GR providers, national governments may consider themselves
indispensable actors in regulating activities under their jurisdiction,
26
including exploration of GR.
In practice, because political and social structures in individual
nations differ, there seems to be no entirely consistent pattern of PIC
requirements.
Some legislatures recognize the decisive role of
indigenous or local communities in the operation of PIC, making
access to GR impossible without their genuine consent. 27 However, to
ensure more efficient access, several governments control the PIC
process so as to make the will of local people relatively marginal or to

21.
See infra Part I.A (discussing the incorporation of PIC into international
environmental law).
22.
See infra Part III (reviewing the different national practices implemented
to achieve PIC).
23.
See Jeffery, supra note 4, at 791 (arguing for the need to balance
commercial profits with the indigenous need for resources).
24.
See id. at 790 (mentioning that industry is the driving force of profit
creation arising from use of genetic resources). Apart from bioprospecting activities, the
disclosure of significant GR involves many scientific stages, including sampling,
screening, extracting, testing, undertaking clinical trials, and other steps involving
biotechnology. See id. at 755-57, 757 n.51.
25.
Scientists and academic researchers are increasingly criticizing the tight
control of GR by national governments. See Andrew C. Revkin, Biologists Sought a
Treaty; Now They Fault It, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at F1 (describing that current
biology restrictions prevent justifiable scientific research); Jeffery, supra note 4, at 793
(pointing out that states may unduly restrict access to genetic resources for scientific
research because of worry about the exploitation of state resources for commercial
purposes).
26.
Jeffery, supra note 4, at 791.
27.
Safrin, supra note 10, at 654-55.
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treat their wishes only as one factor in the determination of whether
to grant final consent. 28 The different practices have drawn criticism
and complaints from scholars, researchers, and GR users. Some
critics are skeptical of an overly burdensome PIC procedure that
collapse
project
bioprospecting
a
desirable
make
could
unreasonably. 29 Critics have also targeted the neglect of local voices
by national authorities in obtaining PIC. 30 Further, there is a grave
concern that access-restrictive regimes inspired by the CBD "have
Thus, not
driven companies away from bioprospecting." 31
surprisingly, it is argued that the increasingly excessive protection of
be replaced by a more accessGR by national authorities should
32
friendly system of GR regulation.
After the CBD, which confirmed states' authority to regulate GR
access, international efforts to ensure better implementation of ABS
In addition to the CBD Bonn
continue to make progress.
Guidelines, 33 which promise capacity building for contracting parties,
especially developing countries, efforts have focused on negotiating
and elaborating an international regime on ABS with possible
enforcement power. 34 Of course, the treatment of PIC in the current
draft of the proposed international regime merits assessment given
35
the document's potentially binding nature.
The increasing global concern over the GR access system cannot
produce a satisfactory outcome without proper enforcement on a local
basis. This Article will, therefore, engage in a comparative study
concerning how genetically-rich nations implement the PIC
requirement with a view toward examining whether the objectives of
the CBD have been fulfilled. Following the analysis of the legal
implications of PIC embodied both in national and international

Id. at 652.
28.
29.
Id. at 655-57 (assessing a failing bioprospecting project between a U.S.
government agency and Mexican indigenous peoples).
Id. at 658-60 (arguing that a robust state GR control ignoring the consent
30.
right of local GR providers "threaten[s] the autonomy and interests of individuals and
indigenous communities").
Id. at 668.
31.
32.
Id. at 668, 680-85 (arguing that a more open system of access to genetic
material would encourage innovation, promote conservation of such material, and
facilitate collaboration between developed and developing countries and highlighting
significant problems with sovereign ownership and control of genetic material).
33.
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),
Apr. 7-19, 2002, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention
on Biological Diversity at Its Sixth Meeting, Decision VI/24(A) (Bonn Guidelines on
Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out
of their Utilization), U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20, Annex, at 262, available at
http://www.cbd.intldoc/decisions/COP-06-dec-en.pdf [hereinafter Bonn Guidelines].
See infra Part II.C.
34.
See id.
35.
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contexts, this Article argues for an optimal normative construction of
PIC, either locally or globally.
After reviewing PIC's origin and its application by international
environmental rules, Part II continues to disclose the legal
implications of PIC under the CBD and its subsequent developments.
Part III engages in a comparative study of national implementations
of PIC, particularly by analyzing their pertinent laws and
regulations.
The analysis of developing countries' practices
constitutes the major content, given that most of the world's GR are
located within their territories. 36 Further, in light of an overall
assessment of the global and local practices, Part IV will reveal some
critical issues facing the PIC system with a view toward proposing
regime better designed to serve the interests of all humankind.
Finally, Part V offers a conclusion.

II. THE CBD

AND SUBSEQUENT LAW MAKING OF

PIC

ON

GENETIC RESOURCES ACCESS

A. The Origin of PIC and Its Incorporationin International
EnvironmentalRules
Informed consent constitutes a cornerstone in the patientphysician relationship. In effect, physicians are obliged to "disclose
information to the quality of a patient's or subject's understanding
and consent. '37 The patients are entitled to be informed of any risk
and consequence of medical treatment. 38 In addition, medical
39
treatment normally cannot proceed without this informed consent.
Informed consent is concerned with minimizing risk and
"avoiding unfairness and exploitation." 40 However, the practice of
mandating informed consent has also evolved to protect patients' and

36.
However, some access systems in developed countries may provide a useful
reference and experience. For instance, the U.S. Yellowstone National Park has signed
agreements with bioprospectors to engage the latter in research on bioresources within
the park. Further, the U.S. has prescribed laws and regulations over GR access in its
national parks. See Communication from the United States, Access to Genetic Resources
Regime of the United States National Parks, IPC/W/393 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/art27_3be.htm.
Australia
has
also
developed legal systems regarding access to its rich GR, such as in the area of the
Great Barrier Reef. See Sally Petherbridge, Australia:Draft Regulations on Access and
Benefit Sharing, in ACCESSING BIODIVERSITY AND SHARING THE BENEFITS: LESSONS
FROM IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 201, 201-23

(Santiago Carrizosa et al. eds., 2004); see infra Part III.F.
37.
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 77 (5th ed. 2001) (emphasis added).
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
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subjects' right of autonomy. 41 In the practice of medicine, informed
consent proceeds via the following five-step sequence: (1) competence;
42
(2) disclosure; (3) understanding; (4) voluntariness; and (5) consent.
PIC has effectively been incorporated into international
environmental rules-it has already become a useful mechanism in
regulating the transboundary movement of substances that may pose
For
risks of potential harm to national or local environments.
instance, the Basel Convention requires that hazardous waste not be
exported without written consent from the importing state.4 3 Upon
receipt of a request to export waste, the importing state may respond
to the request by consenting, denying the transboundary movement,
or requesting additional information. 44 Additionally, the recent
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety has effectively helped to regulate the
international movement of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs). 4 5 To
safeguard the domestic health and environment, the Protocol employs
a similar mechanism to that of the Basel Convention, requiring an
advance informed agreement (AIA) prior to any transboundary
to secure an ALA also mirrors
movement of LMOs. 46 The procedure
47
the rules of the Basel Convention.
Overall, states' observance of PIC represents a sort of good
neighbor policy. Forms of PIC modified to fit the needs of individual
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), rather than used
uniformly, have been applied regularly in MEAs as a mechanism to
ensure respect for the autonomy of nations likely to be affected by
transboundary activities. Of course, the implementation of PIC could
also safeguard national public interest from undesirable damage as a
result of unregulated transnational activities.
B. The CBD and Bonn Guidelines
During the era of free access to GR, national governments,
indigenous peoples, and local communities were generally not
formally informed of any bioprospecting activities occurring within
their territories. 48 As a result, the biosearching activities were

41.
Id.; see also ROBERT M. VEATCH, THE BASICS OF BIOETHIcs 72 (2d ed. 2003)
(discussing the importance of informed consent in patient care and human subject
research).
BEAUcHAMP & CHILDRESS, supranote 37, at 79.
42.
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
43.
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal art. 4(1)(c), Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126
[hereinafter Basel Convention].
44.
Id. art. 6(2).
45.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
art. 1, June 5, 1992, available at http://www.cbd.int/docllegal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf.
46.
Id. art. 7.
47.
Id. arts. 8-10, 12; Basel Convention, supranote 43, art. 6.
48.
Jeffery, supra note 4, at 4-5, 22.
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conducted without the approval or consent of the relevant
stakeholders. Of course, bioprospecting can lead to the discovery of
valuable GR, which can lead to large profits. 49 Nevertheless,
unregulated exploration often causes damage to the territory being
explored. 50 Thus, the CBD incorporates the spirit of PIC into the GR
access regime, providing that "[a]ccess to genetic resources shall be
subject to prior informed consent of the Contracting Party providing
such resources, unless otherwise determined by that Party."'51 The
CBD simply declares its intention to mandate PIC in the GR access
process without defining it. In effect, a GR user is required to obtain
PIC before accessing GR in states that possess GR. GR providers are
entitled to choose whether to consent to such applications. However,
the CBD itself does not articulate the details of the requirement.
The absence of both a clear definition of the term and a detailed
configuration of the PIC system to sustain it leaves much to be filled
in. The single provision of the CBD alone cannot provide resolution
for a variety of issues that may be of critical importance, including,
inter alia, the following:
1. Who is entitled to consent to GR access: national
governments, private owners, or local communities? 52
Should PIC consent be granted on a single-subject or multisubject basis?
2. What are the specific rights and obligations allocated
among GR providers and users? For instance, what sort of
information should GR users submit to obtain the consent?
3. What is the due procedure governing a PIC system? What
role should PIC play in the context of access to GR? 53
At the CBD's fifth meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, in May 2000, the
Conference of the Parties (COP) created an Ad Hoc Open-Ended
Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing (Working Group),

49.
Id. at 790.
50.
Pamela Chasek et al., Access to Genetic Resources: An Evaluation of the
Development and Implementation of Recent Regulation and Access Agreements 3-4
(Environmental Policy Studies Workshop, 1999 School of International and Public
Affairs Columbia University
Working Paper No. 4, 1999), available at
http://www.cbd.int/doc/case-studies/abslcs-abs-agr-rpt.pdf.
51.
CBD, supra note 1, art. 15(5).
52.
See Jeffery, supra note 4, at 786 (observing that uncertainty as to who owns
the consent right will create particular difficulties for bioprospectors because the GR
users will not be able to "determin[e] with whom they should be providing information
and from whom they should be containing consent").
53.
See also Laurel A. Firestone, You Say Yes, I Say No; Defining Community
PriorInformed Consent Under the Convention on Biological Diversity, 16 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 171, 185 (2003) (dissecting the elements under the CBD); Jeffery, supra
note 4, at 786 (discussing the requirements, methodologies and procedures used in
implementing a PIC); Chasek et al., supra note 50, at 72-74 (discussing difficulties in
determining whom to inform and what information should be disclosed).
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which aims to help nations implement the ABS regime by developing
guidelines and other approaches. 54 Engaging in negotiations and
deliberations in Bonn, Germany, during October 2001, the Working
55
Group finished a draft of the Bonn Guidelines.
At its sixth meeting, in the Hague in April 2002, the COP
adopted the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair
and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their
Utilization. 56 The Bonn Guidelines are designed to assist parties in
effectively and optimally implementing the ABS mandate. 57 Despite
their voluntary nature, 58 the Guidelines may help clarify the
otherwise vague access and benefit-sharing provisions of the CBD. 59
The Guidelines provide a roadmap to assist relevant GR players,
such as GR providers, users, and indigenous and local communities,
in realizing their duties and rights within the ABS regime.6 0 As a
result, the major contributions of the Guidelines are to help nations
identify the steps involved in the process of ABS and to provide them
with useful guidance in the design and establishment of an
appropriate national regime.
Like the CBD, however, the Guidelines do not define PIC;
nonetheless, the instrument does formulate a set of useful references
upon which parties may rely to achieve better management of a PIC
system. 61 Primarily, it specifies certain basic principles of a PIC
system, which include:
(1) Legal certainty and clarity;
(2) Facilitation of access to genetic resources at minimum cost;
(3) Restrictions on access to genetic resources that are transparent,
based on legal grounds, and that do not run counter to the
objectives of the Convention; and
(4) Consent of relevant competent national authorities in the provider
country, and also consent of relevant stakeholders, such as

54.
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),
May 15-26, 2000, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the
Convention on Biological Diversity at Its Fifth Meeting, Decision V/26(A) (Access to
Genetic Resources: Access and Benefit-Sharing Arrangements), at 197, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23, Annex III, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/COP05-dec-en.pdf.
55.
Conference of the Parties to the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD),
Apr. 8-19, 2002, Report of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Access and
Benefit-Sharing, 29, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/6 (Oct. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-06/official/cop-06-06-en.pdf.
56.
Bonn Guidelines, supra note 33.
57.
Id. 12.
58.
Id. 7.
59.
However, irrespective of their usefulness, the Guidelines do not aim to
change the rights and obligations of contracting parties under the Convention on
Biological Diversity. See id. 2 (highlighting how a party's obligations under the CBD
remain unaffected).
60.
Id. 9 13-16.
61.
Id.
26.
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and local communities, as appropriate
62
circumstances and subject to domestic law.
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to

the

The application of the principles of legal certainty, economy, and
transparency in PIC will help national GR access systems facilitate
bioprospecting and avoid unnecessary barriers and restrictions
against GR prospective users. 63 The principles send a clear message
to national governments that they should refrain from abusing or
misusing the system and are expected to run it on a fair and open
basis.
Moreover, with respect to which entity has the legal power to
consent, principle (4) clearly specifies that competent national
authorities (CNAs) are the primary entities that can consent to GR
access. 64 However, principle (4) also acknowledges the important role
of indigenous and local communities in the consent process-they
may share the right to consent in accordance with domestic law. The
move to support the participation of relevant stakeholders in a PIC
process is significant and suggests progress. Yet, the phrase "as
appropriate to the circumstances and subject to domestic law"
indicates that local stakeholders' consent carries less weight than
65
that of CNAs.
In addition, some suggested elements of a PIC system are as
follows:
(a) Competent authority(ies) granting or providing for evidence of
prior informed consent;
(b) Timing and deadlines;
(c) Specification of use;
(d) Procedures for obtaining prior informed consent;
(e) Mechanism for consultation of releVant stakeholders; [and]
(f) Process.

66

The Guidelines indicate the establishment of a CNA as the
critical element for running a PIC system. Despite the possible
difficulty of establishing such an authority in certain countries, 6 7 a
well-functioning authority responsible for PIC may reduce

62.

Id.

63.
See Jeffery, supra note 4, at 797 (outlining the necessary elements for a PIC
system to succeed).
64.
Bonn Guidelines, supra note 33,
15, 28, 32 (describing the ability of
national authorities to retain control over consent or to delegate that control to another
party).
65.
Id. 26.

66.

Id.

27.

67.
See Jeffery, supra note 4, at 798 (pointing out that the factors causing such
difficulty include the system of government in a particular country; the overlapping
jurisdiction of various agencies, and the interface with established legal rights of
indigenous and local communities associated with the genetic resources being
accessed).
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transaction costs for the private sector. 68 More importantly, the
establishment of a CNA would curtail notorious biopiracy activities.
As Jeffrey has argued, "[T]he establishment of competent national
authorities and the appropriate focal point to coordinate and
disseminate access information may also serve to discourage
biopiracy, some of which may owe its existence to frustration in
obtaining relevant information as opposed to deliberate intention to
'69
avoid obtaining PIC.
Moreover, element (1) further elaborates on basic principle (4) by
reiterating that a PIC application, in principle, shall be obtained from
the CNA of a contracting party that possesses GR. 70 Meanwhile, the
authorities governing the system are required to respect the
"established legal rights of indigenous and local communities
'71
associated with the [GR] being accessed.
Element (2) simply calls for PIC to be sought adequately in
advance so as to be meaningful for both those seeking and those
granting access. To avoid unreasonable delay, national authorities
are expected to make the decision on applications for access "within a
'72
reasonable period of time.
Element (3) suggests that PIC be based on the specific uses for
which consent has been requested. A new application for PIC may be
required upon any change of use, including transfer to third parties. 73
In particular, the Guidelines provide a number of constructive
clues as to what information should be submitted by GR applicants
under element (4). The suggested list contains the following items:
(a) Legal entity and affiliation of the applicant and/or collector and
contact person when the applicant is an institution;
(b)

Type and quantity of genetic resources to which access is sought;

(c)

Starting date and duration of the activity;

(d) Geographical prospecting area;
(e)

Evaluation of how the access activity may impact on conservation
and sustainable use of biodiversity, to determine the relative costs
and benefits of granting access;
(f) Accurate information regarding intended use (e.g.: taxonomy,
collection, research, commercialization);
(g) Identification of where the research and development will take
place;
(h) Information on how the research and development is to be carried
out;

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 799.
Id.
Bonn Guidelines, supra note 33,
Id. 31.
Id. 33.
Id. 34.

28.
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Identification of local bodies for collaboration in research and
development;

(0) Possible third-party involvement;
(k) Purpose of the collection and research and expected results;
(1) Kinds/types of benefits that could come from obtaining access to
the resource, including benefits from derivatives and products
arising from the commercial and other utilization of the genetic
resource;
(in) Indication of benefit-sharing arrangements;

(n) Budget;
(o)

Treatment of confidential information.

74

The proposed list of required information should be complete and
sufficient so as to facilitate reasonable, informed decision making by
national authorities. However, for researchers or companies, the
disclosure of sensitive or confidential information poses a significant
challenge, especially in the case of information relating to research
and development, as suggested in item (8) above. 75 There is some
concern that the demand for disclosure of information contradicts the
parties' right to confidentiality. 76
Thus, not surprisingly, a
commentator is skeptical of applicants' willingness to submit
77
information critical to their business or research.
In addition, difficulties may arise as to how to ascertain or
evaluate the promising benefits of GR access when the GR
exploration in question has yet to proceed. "[T]he high risk and
concomitant lack of certainty involved in commercialization of genetic
resources" may also frustrate efforts to identify real benefits relating
to the resources. 78 Item (12) simply suggests submitting the "kinds or
types" of such benefits instead of detailed benefits; however, this
allowance may reduce the burden of disclosure for GR applicants.
The content of the suggestions in the list will continue to be
questioned. The Guidelines do indicate, however, that the disclosure
of information included in the list is optional and that its use may be
79
adapted to national special needs.
The Guidelines do not specify details on element (5) either. It is
clear, however, that a PIC system could not operate in an optimal
manner without the formulation of a mechanism for consultation of
80
relevant stakeholders.

74.
Id.
36.
75.
Chasek et al., supra note 50, at iii.
76.
Id.
77.
ELLI
LOUKA,
INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW:
FAIRNESS,
EFFECTIVENESS, AND WORLD ORDER 313 (2006).
78.
Jeffery, supranote 4, at 801.
79.
Bonn Guidelines, supra note 33, 36.
80.
This element of PIC echoes the Guidelines' device on "Participation of
Stakeholders" at Part III, proposing that relevant stakeholders should be consulted
and their views taken into consideration on ABS issues. In addition, the Guidelines
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With respect to element (6), in terms of the form of applications
to obtain PIC and the decisions on the grant, the Guidelines require
the process to be "documented in written form."' 81 GR access, as
'82
suggested, could be granted "by issuing a permit or license.
The Bonn Guidelines aim to aid parties in building their capacity
to implement an ABS regime, but they are not legally binding. Using
the term "should" instead of "shall" has relieved contracting parties of
many obligations under the Guidelines. However, the Guidelines do
provide countries with a useful reference, such that the influence of
83
the document should not be underestimated.
Admittedly, the Guidelines' perspective on PIC may clarify some
of the questions raised above in this Subpart and may help parties
manage a PIC system.
Overall, the Guidelines are delicately
constructed and are devoted to the creation of a balance of rights and
obligations between PIC seekers-namely GR applicants-and
consent givers, CNAs and domestic stakeholders with a view to
encouraging the disclosure of necessary information and avoiding the
abuse of consent rights. However, in terms of distributing consent
power among domestic entities, the Bonn Guidelines have confirmed
the primary legal capacity and indispensable role of national
authorities in governing a PIC system.8 4 Though the instrument
clearly emphasizes the significant status of indigenous and local
communities in a PIC mechanism, nations maintain the discretion to
determine what role they will play.
Lastly, in balancing the major power of CNAs in granting PIC,
the Bonn Guidelines also call for authorities to be responsible for the
design and monitoring of a national ABS regime, including matters of
85
GR access.

advise contracting parties to set up national consultative committees to include
relevant stakeholder representatives. Id.
18-19.
81.
Id. 38.
82.
Id. 39.
83.
See Jeffery, supra note 4, at 795 (arguing that effective Bonn Guidelines
are critical to overall success of the CBD).
84.
Id. at 798-99.
85.
The Bonn Guidelines provide the following:
Competent national authorities, where they are established, may, in
accordance with applicable national legislative, administrative, or policy
measures, be responsible for granting access and be responsible for advising on:
(a)

The negotiating process;

(b)

Requirements for obtaining prior informed consent and entering into
mutually agreed terms;

(c)

Monitoring and evaluation of access and benefit-sharing agreements;

(d)

Implementation/enforcement of access and benefit-sharing agreements;

(e)

Processing of applications and approval of agreements;

()

The conservation and sustainable use of the genetic resources accessed;
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C. The Proposed InternationalRegime
1.

An Overview of the Regime to Enforce PIC

The non-binding character of the Bonn Guidelines may not
satisfy the expectation that the CBD should play a more dominant
role in the supervision and facilitation of ABS for genetic resources.
Accordingly, a special international institution empowered with
legally binding instruments and concerted enforcement devices was
initiated shortly after the adoption of the Bonn Guidelines.
The idea of an international regime to govern ABS for genetic
resources originated at the World Summit on Sustainable
Development held in Johannesburg in September 2002. Paragraph
42(o) of the Plan of Implementation adopted by the Summit explicitly
called for action to "negotiate within the framework of the Convention
on Biological Diversity, bearing in mind the Bonn Guidelines, an
international regime to promote and safeguard the fair and equitable
sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic
86
resources."
The task of formulating the context of the international regime
was allocated to the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Access
and Benefit-Sharing with the aim of addressing the process, nature,
scope, elements, and modalities of the regime.8 7 A preliminary work
prepared by the Working Group regarding the negotiation of an
international regime was then submitted at the seventh meeting of
the COP to the Convention on Biological Diversity in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, in February 2004.88 Section D of Decision VII/19 adopted
by the COP addressed the "International Regime on Access to Genetic
Resources and Benefit-Sharing. '8 9 The decision also requested that

(g)

Mechanisms for the effective participation of different stakeholders, as
appropriate for the different steps in the process of access and benefitsharing, in particular, indigenous and local communities;

(h)

Mechanisms for the effective participation of indigenous and local
communities while promoting the objective of having decisions and
processes available in a language understandable to relevant indigenous
and local communities.

Bonn Guidelines, supra note 33,
14.
86.
World Summit on Sustainable Development, Aug. 26-Sept. 4, 2002, Plan of

Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development,

42(o), adopted in

U.N. Doc. AICONF.199/20, at 139 (Jan. 1, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/esal
sustdev/documentsWSSD_POIPD/English/WSSD_.PlanImpl.pdf.
87.
International Regime on Access and Benefit Sharing, http://www.cbd.int
abs/regime.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
88.
Id.
89.
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Feb. 9-

20, 2004, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity at Its Seventh Meeting, Decision VII/19(D), at 298, U.N. Doc.
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the Working Group, with the collaboration of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended
Inter-Session Working Group on Article 8(j), ensure the wide and
effective participation of relevant ABS stakeholders, including
indigenous and local communities and NGOs, among others. 90
Further, the terms of reference underlying the process, nature,
scope, and elements for consideration in elaboration of the regime are
included in the annex to Decision VII/19 D. 91 In contrast to the
literally non-binding nature of the Bonn Guidelines, the terms of
reference suggest that the instruments of the regime could be of a
legally binding character in order to effectively safeguard the ABS
mandate of the CBD. 92 In addition to genetic resources, it also
expands the scope of the regime to the protection of traditional
knowledge (TK), innovations, and practices originally covered by
Article 8(j) of the CBD. 93 In terms of access to GR, the draft
contemplates that the regime should give indigenous and local
communities a more vocal status. In effect, it suggests that measures
to ensure compliance with the PIC of these local groups holding TK
associated with GR should be considered by the Working Group as a
94
component of the regime.
The content of the international regime was further refined
during meetings of the Working Group based upon Decision VII/19
D. 95 At its eighth meeting in Curitiba, Brazil, in March 2006, the
COP adopted decision VIII/4 A, 96 in which a more delicate
arrangement of the designated international regime was revealed in
its Annex.9 7 Yet much of the language, with or without compulsory
effect, remained undecided. Thus differential, even conflicting, views
were marked with brackets. The 2006 text simply reflects the
divergent visions of all parties, 98 subject to future negotiations.9 9

UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21, Annex (June 15, 2004), available at http://www.cbd.int/
doc/decisions/COP-07-dec-en.pdf [hereinafter COP Decision VII/19(D)].
90.
Id. at 300.
91.
Id. at 301.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 302.
95.
See International Regime on Access and Benefit Sharing, supra note 87
(noting that two meetings were held by the Working Group in Bangkok, Thailand, Feb
14-18, 2005, and in Granada, Spain, Jan. 30-Feb. 3, 2006, respectively)
96.
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Mar.
20-31, 2006, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity at Its Eighth Meeting, Decision VIII14(A), at 52, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/8/31 (June 15, 2006), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/
COP-08-dec-en.pdf [hereinafter COP Decision VIII/4(A)].
97.
Id. at 54.
98.
See generally Chee Yoke Ling, CBD Meeting Ends with Draft Elements of
Access and Benefit Sharing Regime, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, Feb. 3, 2006,
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twninfo342.htm
(showing
that
there
were
disagreements on many issues among developed and developing countries, including
the following: the need for a new instrument and whether it should be legally binding;
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On the element of PIC covered by the mandate of the regime, the
text reiterates the authority of GR-providing parties to grant PIC.l00
More importantly, the text expands the scope of PIC to include
interaction between contracting parties of origin and contracting
parties that are not countries of origin of the GR but hold certain
GR.1°1 This design requires the latter to restrict access to any GR in
question without the PIC of the former, which may reinforce the
102
consent right of GR origin countries.
Certainly, the most novel and ambitious initiative pursued by
the international regime is the establishment of a compliance and
enforcement mechanism. Not surprisingly, the international regime
may play a key role in ensuring compliance of the countries providing
GR with regard to PIC. In effect, it might be the regime's task to
prevent misappropriation and unauthorized access to and use of GR,
which, of course, includes GR access without PIC. 10 3 However, the
proposed text has yet to determine whether such an agenda is a
mandate of the regime or should be imposed at the regime's
04
discretion.
In addition, with a view toward establishing a notion of global
responsibility to enforce the ABS mandate irrespective of the country
of GR origin, the 2006 text obliges all parties to ensure that the
utilization of GR within their jurisdictions complies with the CBD
and the conditions under which access was granted.' 0 5 Thus, any
violation of the mandate by GR users should be sanctioned on a
06
national basis.'
Moreover, in response to a number of patents that were granted
as a result of the absence of a proper access regime, 10 7 the 2006 draft
restricts recipients of GR from applying for patents related to such
resources without PIC.10 8 This move simply reflects the general

the inclusion of derivatives and products of genetic resources and associated traditional
knowledge; disclosure requirements in applications for intellectual property rights; and
enhanced participation of indigenous and local communities in the ABS negotiations).
99.
COP Decision VIII/4(A), supra note 96, at 52 (stating that the Working
Group was requested to continue the formulation of the regime and to complete its
work before the tenth meeting of the COP).
100.
Id. at 55.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 59 (providing a list of activities constituting misappropriation, which
includes use of GR without compliance with the provisions of the regime).
104.
See id. ("[International regime [shall] [may] contain measures to [[promote]
and [ensure]] compliance with the prior informed consent of the country providing
genetic resources ...... ) (emphasis added).
105.
Id. at 60.
106.
Id.
107.
Ni, supra note 14, at 437-39. See generally DUTFIELD, BIOGENETIC
RESOURCES, supra note 3, at 52-59 (stating that the undesirable granted patents have
been labeled as a result of biopiracy).
108.
COP Decision VIII]4(A), supra note 96, at 58-59.
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views of developing countries with rich genetic resources who favor
compliance with ABS requirements as a condition upon which
patents related to certain GR can be legally granted.109
Since then, under the intense negotiations and labor of the
fifth 110 and sixth 111 meetings of the ABS Working Group, the
configuration of the international regime has been further debated
and elaborated. 112 At its ninth meeting in Bonn, Germany, in May
2008, the COP adopted a decision 113 confirming the ongoing progress
made in the Working Group, 114 mainly highlighting Annex I to the
decision.' 15 But, as in the 2006 draft, the essence of the objective,
scope, and subject matter of the regime remain unsettled, and

109.
See Communication from the United States, Article 27.3(B), Relationship
Between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the Protection of Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, IP/CIW/434, pt. II (Nov. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.wto.org/englishltratope/trips_e/art27_3b-e.htm (stating that the United
States supports the generally shared objectives including achieving equitable sharing
of the benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge and genetic resources).
Since the launch of the WTO Doha round negotiations, the issue of preventing
biopiracy that leads to the grant of undesirable patents based upon illicit access to GR
has been formally introduced into the forum. Developing countries have been calling
for revision of the TRIPS agreement to oblige member states to mandate a disclosure of
ABS elements as a prerequisite to grant patents. Their appeal, however, has met
strong resistance from some industrialized countries, especially the United States. See
id. (arguing that TRIPS and the CBD agreements can coexist and stating the U. S.
position against new patent disclosure requirements); Communication from the United
States, Article 27.3(B), Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and
the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, IP/C/W/449 (June 10, 2005)
(arguing same); see also Communication from the United States, Article 27.3(B),
Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the Protection of
TraditionalKnowledge and Folklore, IP/C/W/469 (Mar. 13, 2006) (same). See generally
Ni, supra note 14, at 446-58 (analyzing the agendas of developing countries).
110.
Convention of Biological Diversity, Oct. 8-12, 2007, Report of the Ad Hoc
Open-Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing on the Work of Its Fifth
Meeting, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBDIWG-ABS/5/8 (Oct. 15, 2007), available at
http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/abs/abswg-05/officiallabswg-05-08-en.pdf
[hereinafter
Fifth Working Group Meeting Report].
111.
Conference of the Parties to the Convention of Biological Diversity, May
19-21, 2008, Report of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Access and BenefitSharing on the Work of Its Sixth Meeting, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/9/6 (Jan. 31,
2008), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-09/officiallcop-09-06-en.doc
[hereinafter Sixth Working Group Meeting Report].
112.
See generally Fifth Working Group Meeting Report, supra note 110
(illustrating the debate over the configuration of the international regime); Sixth
Working Group Meeting Report, supra note 111 (same).
113.
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, May
19-30, 2008, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity at Its Ninth Meeting, Decision IX/12, at 50, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29 (June 30, 2008), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/
decisions/COP-09-dec-en.pdf [hereinafter COP Decision IX/12].
114.
Id.
115.
Id. at 53.
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different "options" for a single issue are plainly presented in the
116
Annex.
In contrast to other elements of the regime, the 2008 text has
elaborated on the topic of "compliance," especially by alleviating the
attempt of the 2006 draft to oblige GR countries to enforce ABS.
Such a development may be a reflection of Switzerland's balanced
compromise approach. 117 To distinguish matters on which consensus
has been reached from those to be further discussed and
negotiated," 8 the 2008 draft divides the proposed elements into two
categories: first, components to be further elaborated with the aim of
incorporating them in the international regime, and second,
components for further consideration. 119 Under each category, the
compliance mechanism is classified into three groups and levels:
development of tools to encourage compliance, development of tools to
monitor compliance, and development of tools to enforce
120
compliance.
The first category actually contains quite few items, referring
only to awareness-raising activities, information exchange, and
internationally recognized certificates, all of which are relatively soft
compliance mechanisms. 121
As a result, many critical and
controversial issues are placed in the second category and await
further discussion. For instance, the second category includes an
understanding of the problem of misappropriation of GR, to be
22
considered for the development of tools for encouraging compliance. 1
International access standards, largely a concern of GR users, has
been raised and negotiated during the meetings of the Working
Group. After many developing countries voiced their objection to
placement of the item under "development of tools to enforce
compliance," they reached a compromise with the EC and its member
states and also placed it under the heading "development of tools to
1 23
encourage compliance."'
Disclosure requirements, a major compliance and enforcement
concern of GR-providing countries, fall under the grouping
"development of tools to monitor compliance," as do some technical
124
instruments to support compliance, like tracking systems.
The group of components to consider in the "development of tools
to enforce compliance" is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of ABS
compliance. A number of significant items fall under this heading,

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 53-55, 59.
Fifth Working Group Meeting Report, supra note 110, 26.
Sixth Working Group Meeting Report, supra note 111, 61.
Id.
COP Decision IX/12, supra note 113, at 56-57.
Id.
Id. at 57.
Sixth Working Group Meeting, supra note 111,
62, 68.
COP Decision IX/12, supra note 113, at 57.
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including measures to ensure access to justice, dispute settlement
mechanisms, enforcement of judgments and arbitral awards across
jurisdictions, information exchange procedures between individual
CNAs and benefit sharing to assist GR providers in obtaining
information regarding breaches of PIC requirements, and remedies
125
and sanctions.
To assist the Working Group by providing legal and technical
distinct groups
advice, the ninth COP also decided to establish three
126
of experts, including an expert group on compliance.
2.

A Critique
Compliance

on the

Regime's

Preliminary

Design

of PIC

Both the CBD and Bonn Guidelines delegate the major authority
in enforcing ABS to GR-providing nations. 127 The proposal to create
an international regime is motivated by the concern that the
implementation of ABS solely at a national level would be insufficient
to achieve the objective of the CBD. Given the transnational nature
of bioprospecting activities, the ongoing lawmaking in relation to ABS
demonstrates a resolve to enhance the international regulation of GR
by establishing a regime to coordinate and consolidate collective
strength. Thus, it is no surprise that the compliance and enforcement
mechanism has become a focal point in the negotiations of the
From the perspective of GR-providing
designated regime. 128
unauthorized
countries, the prevention of misappropriation and
129
concern.
major
their
remains
GR
of
use
and
access to
It is obvious that the 2006 configuration may be short of wellbalanced because it largely serves the best interests of GR-providing
countries, especially GR-origin countries that support a more
consolidated international mechanism on ABS. 130 Arguably, this text

Id.
125.
See COP Decision IX/12, supra note 113, at 51-52 (showing that the COP
126.
established an expert group on concepts, terms, working definitions, and sectoral
approaches and an expert group on traditional knowledge associated with genetic
resources, in addition to an expert group on compliance).
See Susan Bragdon et al., Safeguarding Biodiversity: The Convention on
127.
Biological Diversity (CBD), in THE FUTURE CONTROL OF FOOD ch. 5 (Geoff Tansey &
Tasmin Rajotte eds., 2008), available at http://www.idrc.ca/enev-119955-201-1DOTOPIC.html (stating that the CBD relies on the parties for enforcement and do not
include a specific compliance mechanism and that the Bonn Guidelines make little to
no mention of enforcement issues).
COP Decision VIII/4(A), supra note 96, at 58-59.
128.
See id. (suggesting that the 2006 draft tends to touch upon the issue of
129.
preventing grants of intellectual property rights (mainly patents) for an invention that
derives from illegal bioprospecting or biopiracy).
Group of Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries, Ministerial Session, Jan.
130.
20-21, 2005, New Delhi Ministerial Declarationof Like Minded Megadiverse Countries
on Access and Benefit Sharing, available at http://www.undp.orgbiodiversity/docs/
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puts disproportionate weight and emphasis on reinforcement of
sovereign control over GR by advocating a concerted collective
enforcement effort.
The 2008 text, on the other hand, demonstrates the political will
to pursue a more balanced approach.
The inclusion of both
"misappropriation" and "international access standards" in the group
of considerations for encouraging compliance reflects compromise
between GR-providing and GR-using parties.
But this level of
compliance mechanism is clearly short of a mandatory and generates
only a weak commitment for all parties.
The 2008 draft, like the 2006 draft, calls attention to the issue of
disclosure requirements for intellectual property rights (IPR)
applications, listing them as one component to consider in the
"[d]evelopment of tools to monitor compliance. '13 1 However, it leaves
132
the content of the disclosure requirements to be filled in later.
Even though the current text manages to adopt a balanced
approach by, inter alia, addressing the issue of international access
standards favored by GR-using countries, it seems no solid
mechanism has yet been formally crafted to ensure that GR-providing
133
It
nations may fairly open their GR markets to foreign access.
should be noted that the CBD explicitly requires GR-origin countries
to "facilitate" access to GR and "not to impose restrictions that run
counter to the objectives of the CBD. '' 134 At the very least, in terms of
PIC and ABS implementation, it appears that the current draft falls
short of providing a necessary mechanism to prevent national
governments from abusing their right to reviewing access
applications. The failure to create an efficient instrument to monitor
whether countries providing GR exercise their sovereign rights in
good faith may dissuade developed GR-using countries that favor a

Attachment 18 Accepted New Delhi declaration.doc. It is not difficult to imagine why
GR-rich countries, mainly developing countries, favor such an approach. Their views
were disclosed in a meeting held in India in January 2005, in which Bolivia, Brazil,
China, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico,
Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, and Venezuela participated. See id.
131.
COP Decision IX/12, supranote 113, at 56.
132.
Id.
133.
See COP Decision VIII4(A), supra note 96, at 58. The 2006 proposal merely
reiterates some elements suggested by the Bonn Guidelines, providing that: "Access
procedures shall be clear, simple and transparent and provide legal certainty to
different kinds of users and providers of genetic resources with a view to the effective
implementation of Article 15, [paragraph 2], of the Convention on Biological Diversity."
Id.; see also COP Decision IX/12, supra note 113, at 56 (reaffirming these Bonn
principles in the 2008 text). But, according to these texts, no further device can be
found regarding the enforcement of such a mandate. As mentioned earlier, there is
growing concern and criticism over many access regulatory regimes that have been
considered too restrictive. See generally Safrin, supra note 10, at 646-52.
134.
CBD, supra note 1, art. 15(2).
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reasonable and transparent access system from upholding the
135
regime.
Of course, as mentioned above, the effort to build an
international regime will continue until 2010, and the present
proposed text may be modified accordingly. But without first clearly
defining the obligations of each party, it would be legally infeasible to
build an effective compliance and enforcement mechanism, including
a dispute-settlement system. If no definite obligations are imposed
on parties to enforce ABS mandates, international institutions hardly
have grounds to force a party to deal with a presumed ABS violation.
In spite of the current draft's noted deficiencies, it is heartening
that the present text tends to include a dispute-settlement
136
mechanism as one of the functions to be performed by the regime.
The establishment of an impartial and independent disputeresolution system will certainly enhance the credibility of the
regime 137 and could ensure the obligations and rights of parties to be
138
squarely performed.
Whereas the Bonn Guidelines balance the rights and obligations
as to PIC between GR users and providers, the proposed
international regime must avoid the tendency to serve the interests of
GR-providing parties only-i.e., reinforcing the sovereign right of
parties over GR-and instead strive for a proper balance of rights and
obligations between GR-origin and GR-using countries. It may be
acceptable that international access standards would not be
mandatory on GR-providing countries, 139 but the operation of the

135.
See Ling, supra note 98 (showing that during the negotiation of the
international regime, developing countries opposed the notion of the "facilitated access"
favored by major developed countries). Many developed countries insist that there
should be an international obligation to provide access to genetic resources and
disfavor the regime to be legally binding instrument. See Chee Yoke Ling, CBD
Meeting Dominated by Talks on Access and Benefit Sharing Regime, THIRD WORLD
NETWORK, May 29, 2008, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/intellectualproperty/
info.service/2008/twn.ipr.info.080604.htm (summarizing the negotiations related to
benefit sharing regime).
136.
Sixth Working Group Meeting Report, supra note 111, § III(C)(2)(3). Most
environmental treaties have not yet set up a compulsory dispute-settlement system.
BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 18, at 226.
See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 18, at 226 (stating that the major function
137.
of establishing a dispute-settlement mechanism is to provide an authoritative decision
on issues regarding the interpretation or application of a given treaty).
138.
See Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 12-15, 1994,
Understandingon Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 22,
in GeneralAgreement on Tarriffs and Trade: MultilateralTrade Negotiations FinalAct
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1226, 1239 (1994) (stating as an example that the Dispute Settlement Body of the
World Trade Organization has the power to enforce compliance by imposing sanctions
on a breaching party).
139.
It should be kept in mind that by no means are the Bonn Guidelines
intended to unify national access regulatory regimes.
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access regime-namely, the PIC system-must be scrutinized. The
GR-providing nations should consider allowing oversight of their
national authority in exchange for the willingness of GR-using
countries to undertake more obligations to enforce ABS, such as
preventing misappropriation and providing for sanctions on the
violation of GR-providing countries' access laws. Otherwise, the
future of the international regime may not be bright, and the regime
may turn out to be a soft compliance instrument without teeth.

III. NATIONAL PRACTICES OF GENETIC-RESOURCE-RICH COUNTRIES ON
PIC REQUIREMENT

Since the inception of the CBD and the subsequent adoption of
the Bonn Guidelines, many developing countries rich in genetic
resources have started to formulate regulations relating to the
implementation of an ABS mandate. 140 Part III aims to identify a
number of leading national practices and focus on how those nations
manage their PIC mechanisms by examining relevant laws.
A. India
India is renowned for its biodiversity and wealth of genetic
materials. 141 The GR in India, especially plants such as the neem
tree and turmeric, have long been explored, identified, and used in
traditional practices. 142 Indeed, several notable incidents of GR
biopiracy and misappropriation have transpired in connection with
these plants. 143 Such a record may explain why India has been
inclined to tighten GR access as much as possible in recent years.

140.
Safrin, supra note 10, at 641 n.4-5, 649 n.56 (stating that more than forty
nations have enacted or are drafting ABS laws); see Convention on Biological Diversity,
Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing Case Studies, http://www.cbd.int/abs/
cs.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (collecting many national ABS case studies).
141.
See DUTFIELD, BIOGENETIc RESOURCES, supra note 3, at 166-67 (stating
that India accounts for about 7%-8% of the Earth's biodiversity).
142.
See Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between International Intellectual
Property and Environmental Protection: Biodiversity and Biotechnology, 76 WASH. U.
L.Q. 255, 258 (1998) (describing the effectiveness of the neem tree and tumeric);
DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 65-66.
143.
See DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 65-66
(stating that the most cited cases of biopiracy of Indian GR are those of bad patents
granted for native Indian plants such as neem and turmeric); Suman Sahai, Indigenous
Knowledge and Its Protection in India, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 10, at 166, 168. For a
discussion on the background that promotes international movement toward tightening
the access to national genetic raw materials, see Ni, supra note 14, at 437-41; Safrin,
supra note 10, at 646-52 (not particularly mentioning the biopiracy issue, but
emphasizing the intention of those developing countries to consider GR as green oil and
to own it exclusively).
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The enforcement of such rigid laws governing GR access is a clear
mitigate problems
attempt on the part of the Indian government to144
associated with the previously loose control of GR.
Enacted in 2002, the Indian Biological Diversity Act 145 is a
relatively new piece of legislation that implements the CBD's
mandates in a straightforward manner. 146 To echo the call of the
Bonn Guidelines in establishing a competent national authority, the
law created the National Biodiversity Authority (NBA)147 responsible
for, inter alia, regulating attempts to access resources. 148 Foreigners
are prohibited from obtaining any biological resources endogenous to
India or from procuring knowledge associated thereto for research
purposes, commercial utilization, or for biosurvey and bio-utilization
without the previous approval of the NBA. 149 In contrast, Indian
citizens may obtain access to biological resources after giving prior
150
notice to the relevant established authority.
The NBA literally monopolizes the PIC system and ignores the
consent rights of other local stakeholders because the Indian law only
requires the NBA to engage in "consultation" with local biodiversity
committees. 15 1 Further, there is no established role for individuals,
indigenous people, or local groups in the PIC-granting process. The
absence of those stakeholders' contributions to the GR access
approval process is indicative of the single-consent nature of the
governing statute. Indeed, in a broad sense, the Indian access regime

See Safrin, supra note 10, at 665-66 (providing a general description of the
144.
practice of requiring patent applicants to demonstrate compliance with GR access
laws); Ni, supra note 14, at 446-59 (analyzing the approach used by India and Brazil to
amend TRIPS to mandate all members link patent applications to the observance of
access regulations of GR providing nations).
The Biological Diversity Act, 2002, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2003,
145.
available at http://envfor.nic.inidivisionsbiodiv/actbio-div act.htm. For the legal
developments regarding the management of Indian biodiversity, see Shalini Bhutani &
Ashish Kothari, The Biodiversity Rights of Developing Nations: A Prospective from
India, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 587, 605-25 (2002); Kaushik, supra note 10, at 25962.
146.
The Biological Diversity Act § 1. The preamble to the Indian Biological
Diversity Act explicitly indicates a close linkage of the law to the CBD. Id.
Id. §§ 8, 18.
147.
Id. § 2. In terms of ABS system, the bioresources governed by the Indian
148.
law are broader than that of the CBD. The former refers to "biological resources,"
which means "plants, animals and micro-organisms or parts thereof, their genetic
material and by-products with actual or potential use or value." Id. § 2(c). By contrast,
the CBD access regime covers GR only. See generally CBD, supra note 1, arts. 2, 15
(defining genetic resources as "genetic material of actual or potential value" and
covering genetic resources only in its access regime).
The Biological Diversity Act § 3(1).
149.
150.
Id. § 7. It has been argued that the differential treatment of foreigners and
nationals is rational because it would be easier to bring citizens under jurisdiction than
foreigners. Kaushik, supra note 10, at 260. But this argument seems weak because
normally foreigners are easily identified.
The Biological Diversity Act § 41(2).
151.
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represents a very typical model of the centralization of GR control by
152
government.
Strictly speaking, Indian law that negated the consent rights of
other civil GR providers is not considered incompatible with the CBD
or Bonn Guidelines because the supranational provisions do not
explicitly recognize the consent right of those parties. However, such
a move to disregard the consent rights of certain stakeholders seems
a clear deviation from increasing international momentum to respect
or recognize the right of indigenous and local peoples to participate in
any decision or process relating to the usage of natural resources
associated with their lives. 153 Likewise, "the paternalistic model"
described by Safrin is likely to pose a challenge to "the autonomy and
'154
interests of individuals and indigenous communities.
B. Brazil
Since 1994, the Brazilian government has initiated several
proposals to regulate GR access, though none have resulted in
legislative enactments. 155 The Brazilian states of Amapa and Acre,
however, have enacted relevant state-level legislation. 156 While the
stipulation of any federal GR access law is still pending, the central
government relies on a Provisional Measure issued in 2001 to govern
ABS matters. 15 7 The initiative aims to regulate not only access to
genetic heritage 158 but also the protection of and access to associated
traditional knowledge (TK); it also concerns the transfer of technology
relating to the conservation and use of GR and TK. 159 Thus, the
regulation seems to pursue a broader objective than that of the
original CBD mandate regarding GR management, irrespective of its
interim nature.

See Safrin, supra note 10, at 659-60.
152.
See infra Part V.A.
153.
154.
See Safrin, supra note 10, at 652, 659-60.
155.
See Jordan E. Erdos, Current Legislative Efforts in Brazil to Regulate
Access to Genetic Resources, PLANETA.COM, Dec. 1999, http://www.planeta.com/planeta/
99/1199brazil.html (describing a number of the bills proposed by Brazilian legislature
concerning the regulation of genetic resources); KATHRYN GARFORTH ET AL., OVERVIEW
OF THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES
available
at
8
(3rd
ed.
2005),
MEASURES
AND
BENEFIT-SHARING

http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/ABSImpStudy-sm.pdf (same).
156.
Erdos, supra note 155.
157.
Medida Provis6ria No. 2.186-16, de 23 de agosto de 2001 (Brazil), available
at http://www.grain.orglbrl/?docid=850&lawid=1768. Authorized by Article 62 of the
Brazilian Constitution, the President of Brazil has the power to adopt the Provisional
Measure. Id.
Id. The Brazilian law that applies to genetic heritage rather than genetic
158.
resources focuses on the "information of genetic origin." Id. art. 7(1). The range of the
regulation seems broader than that of CBD. Id. art. 7(I).
Id. pmbl.
159.
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The Provisional Measure created the Council for the
Management of Genetic Resources under the Ministry of the
Environment as a CNA responsible for the authorization of GR
access. 160 Notably, such an approval for access can only be given to a
domestic public or private institution, 16 1 which appears to exclude
foreigners from conducting bioprospecting in Brazil.
Such a
discriminatory policy might violate Article 15(2) of the CBD, which
requires nations housing GR to facilitate GR access for foreign
6 2
bioprospectors.l
While the Council governs the approval of GR access
applications, the Brazilian Code recognizes the status of GR "owners"
in a manner such that the access authorization cannot be granted
without the PIC of relevant stakeholders. 16 3 The parties who may
give consent are, therefore, quite numerous, including both public
and private entities. 16 4 For endangered species from which GR are
sought, PIC must be obtained from the competent body; 165 otherwise,
interested parties who are entitled to give PIC include the following:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

The indigenous community involved, the views of its official
representative body having been heard where access occurs on
indigenous territory;
The competent body where access occurs in a protected area;
The owner where access occurs on private land;
The National Defense Council where access occurs in an area
indispensable to national security;
The maritime authority where access occurs in Brazilian territorial
waters, on the continental shelf or in the exclusive economic
zone.

166

Exceptionally, a public interest defined by the Management Council
67
may prevail over the will of the stakeholders specified above. 1
168
Therefore, their PIC is not a requirement for access authorization.
Although Brazil generally gives stakeholders the right of
consent, national authority remains the final decision maker on GR
access. Unsurprisingly, as with India, the centralization of GR access
has been accused of adversely affecting the inherent interests of
individuals and indigenous peoples.' 69 Nevertheless, in contrast to
the want of any PIC from local stakeholders in the Indian legal

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. arts. 10, 11.
Id. art. 16.
Id. art. 15, § 2.
Id. art. 16, § 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 16, § 9 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 17.
Id.
Safrin, supranote 10, at 658-60.
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system, the Brazilian model has taken into account the position of
GR-interested parties to some extent.
C. The Philippines
The initial regulatory attempt of the Philippines 170 on GR
bioprospecting is regarded as one of the earliest national legislative
17 1
responses to the CBD's call for incorporating the ABS requirement.
In 1995, even before adoption of the Bonn Guidelines, the country
preliminarily issued Executive Order No. 247 (EO 247 or the EO),
entitled Prescribing Guidelines and Establishing a Regulatory
Framework for the Prospecting of Biological and Genetic Resources,
Their By-Products and Derivatives, for Scientific and Commercial
172
Purposes, and for Other Purposes.
The Inter-Agency Committee on Biological and Genetic
Resources is charged with the enforcement and implementation of the
EO. 1 73 Operating under the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), the Committee is composed of representatives
from relevant governmental agencies. 174
The approval of a
bioprospecting project depends on Committee's recommendation and
the adoption of a research agreement between applicants and the
175
Philippine government.
The EO represents a model GR policy that is extremely
supportive of the interests of indigenous peoples and local
communities in a PIC process. The EO preserves the rights of those
groups to the extent that it sets out a special clause-Consent of
Indigenous Cultural Communities-that requires PIC from such
communities as a prerequisite for authorization of bioprospecting
activities. 76 This clause also mandates that applicants prepare a
research proposal to be delivered to the leaders of those communities,

170.
See Safrin supra note 10, at 654-55 (noting that the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which the Philippines is a member, concluded the
Draft Framework Agreement on Access to Biological and Genetic Resources in 2000,
and also noting that, concerning PIC, the draft mandates that all national and local
resource providers be involved in the process). The Draft Framework Agreement has
yet to be adopted. See GARFORTH ET AL., supra note 155, at 15.
171.
GARFORTH ET AL., supra note 155, at 19.
172.
Prescribing Guidelines and Establishing a Regulatory Framework for the
Prospecting of Biological and Genetic Resources, Their By-Products and Derivatives,
for Scientific and Commercial Purposes, and for Other Purposes, Exec. Ord. No. 247
(May 18, 1995) (Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil.net/executive/execord/eo1995/
eo_247_1995.html.
173.
Id. § 6.
174.
Id. Apart from DENR, the other agencies involved in the function of the
Committee include the Department of Health, Agriculture, Science and Technology,
Foreign Affairs, and National Museum. Id.
175.
Id. § 3.
176.
Id. § 2(b).
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and deliberations for a period up to sixty days are required before a
decision on the application can be made. 177 Furthermore, it is the
duty of the Inter-Agency Committee to ensure that the rights of
indigenous and local communities are protected.1 78 The Committee is
also obligated to stipulate guidelines for PIC implementation to assist
179
local communities in the PIC process.
While the EO gives full consideration to the rights of indigenous
people of PIC, the EO's Implementing Rules and Regulations (DAO
No. 20) address the interests of other stakeholders.18 0 According to
the DAO, PIC shall be secured from subjects including the Local
Community, Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples
(IPs), the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB), or Private
Land Owners. 181 The rules of the DAO also require full disclosure of
"the intent and scope of the bioprospecting activity, in a language and
182
process understandable to the community."'
The procedure to obtain PIC from communities was considered
burdensome for applicants and was a potential deterrent to proper
identification of consent-giving communities. Not surprisingly, at
least one critic is skeptical of the effectiveness of the Philippine
multiple-consent system and has accused the system of creating a
83
risk of anti-commons.1
To some extent, however, the arduousness of the PIC process has
been ameliorated by the subsequent enactment of the Wildlife
Resources Conservation and Protection Act. 184 The Act effectively
addresses its relationship with previous regulations, such as EO 247

177.
See id. § 4 (explaining requirement of sixty-day waiting period after
delivery of proposals before action is taken).
178.
Id.
179.
Id. § 7(e).
180.
See Implementing Rules and Regulations on the Prospecting of Genetic and
Biological Resources, Dep't Admin. Ord. No. 96-20, § 10, (July 9, 1996) (Phil.), available
at http://www.grain.orgfbrl files/philippines-bioprospectingeo247-1996-en.pdf (naming
departments, groups, agencies, and organizations involved and detailing the respective
roles and responsibilities of relevant governmental and non-governmental actors and
stakeholders).
181.
Id. § 2.1(w).
182.
Id.
183.
Safrin, supra note 10, at 653-54. The "anti-commons" refers to a noneconomic outcome in which too many entities own exclusive rights or decision-making
powers over limited resources. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998)
(noting that, in an anti-commons, "multiple owners are each endowed with the right to
exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use.
When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to
underuse.").
184.
An Act Providing for the Conservation and Protection of Wildlife Resources
and Their Habitats, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act
No. 9147, § 14, (July 30, 2001) (Phil.), available at http://www.lawphil.netlstatutes/
repacts/ra2001/ra_9147_2001.html.
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and DAO No. 20, by superseding inconsistent laws, orders, and
regulations. 185 For instance, while the multiple-consent system
remains a requirement in accordance with existing laws, the sixty1 86
day deliberation period has been replaced by "a reasonable period."
However, despite the revisions, only two access projects had been
approved as of early 2004.187
D. Costa Rica
Noted for its richness of biodiversity and GR, 188 Costa Rica
swiftly implemented the CBD mandate through a comprehensive
legal framework on biodiversity. 189 The Biodiversity Law' 90 of Costa
Rica was enacted in 1998 and managed to coordinate and integrate
191
existing regulations on wildlife, forest, and national park systems.
1 92
The object of the law almost entirely mirrors that of the CBD.
The law assigns the task of national biodiversity administration
to two organs: the National Commission for the Management of
Biodiversity (CONAGEBIO) and the National System of Conservation
Areas under the Minister of the Environment and Energy. 193 The
CONAGEBIO is responsible for the formulation and coordination of
GR access policy. 194 It set up a specialized subunit of the Technical
Office to review applications for access to biodiversity resources. 195
The Commission may revoke the Office's decisions on project
196
access.
The law specifies that PIC constitutes one of the basic
requirements for access approval, so it mandates a double-layered

Id. § 40.
185.
186.
Id. § 14.
187.
Chasek et al., supra note 50, at 55; GARFORTH ET AL., supra note 155, at 21.
188.
Costa Rica has long been considered a splendid haven for biodiversity.
Despite its small territorial size, the more than 500,000 species found in the country
account for nearly 4% of the world's species. Instituto Nacional de Bioversidad,
Biodiversity in Costa Rica, http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/biod/bio-biodiver.htm (last visited
Jan. 6, 2009).
Grethel Aguilar, Access to Genetic Resources and Protection of Traditional
189.
Knowledge in Indigenous Territories, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 10, at 175, 179.
(Costa Rica), available at
Biodiversity Law, No. 7788 (1998)
190.
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo/ztxx/yczyhctzsbh/zlk/gglf/200503PO2007062854569464144
3.pdf.
See Vivienne Solis Rivera & Patricia Madrigal Cordero, Costa Rica's
191.
Biodiversity Law: Sharing the Process, 2 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 259, 259-61
(1999) (discussing the background and legislative history of the law).
192.
'The object of the present law is the conservation of biodiversity and the
sustainable use of the resources as well as to distribute in an equitable manner the
benefits and derived costs." Biodiversity Law art. 1.
Id. art. 13.
193.
194.
Id. art. 14(3).
195.
Id. art. 17.
Id. art. 14(6).
196.
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consent system. 197 First, applicants must obtain PIC from local
interested parties closely linked to the GR to be used. 198 The
legislation expressly identifies the following holders of the consent
right: proprietor of the landed estate where activities will take place,
an indigenous community in whose territory the GR is located, and
the director of the Conservation Area. 199 In order to give full respect
to local opinions on GR access, the law further recognizes the right of
local communities and indigenous peoples to oppose any access to
their resources and associated knowledge because of cultural,
2
spiritual, social, economic, or other concerns. 00
In contrast to other multi-consent system practices, the Costa
Rican law involves the Technical Office in the local PIC process by
specifying that the Office's function includes coordinating PIC access
matters with PIC givers. 20 1 To facilitate the exercise of local PIC, the
Office must prepare a model contract upon which those PIC givers
may rely to finalize their consent. 202 The Office also has the
discretion to make field consultations to verify the terms of PIC, if
necessary. 20 3 The Technical Office plays an active and attentive role
in the procedure of obtaining local GR access consent. Of course, the
Office cannot override the will of those interested parties if they later
20 4
decide not to consent to a GR project.
Upon securing such local PIC, any GR access project must then
20 5
obtain the Office's final approval to receive access permission.
Scant complaints have been raised against the country's access
regulations despite the multi-consent character of its PIC system that
206
fully respects local voices.

197.
Id. art. 63(1)-(2).
198.
Id. arts. 63(1), 65.
199.
Id.
200.
Id. art. 66.
201.
Id. art. 17(2).
202.
General Rules for the Access to the Genetic and Biochemical Elements and
Resources of the Biodiversity, Presidential Decree No. 31514-MINAE, art. 9(3) (Apr. 3,
2003) (Costa Rica), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/4019037/costaricarules
accessen [hereinafter Costa Rica Decree] (providing details about what information
should be disclosed by GR applicants to earn the local consent).
203.
Id. art. 12.
204.
See Biodiversity Law arts. 63(1), 66 (noting that prior informed consent
from interested parties is a basic requirement for access and that interested parties
can decide not to consent to a GR project for any motive at all).
205.
Id. art. 63(2).
206.
Most of the bioprospecting activities in Costa Rica have been performed by
the National Biodiversity Institute (INBio), a nongovernmental, nonprofit association.
GARFORTH ET AL., supra note 155, at 12. The Costa Rican practice has often been
acclaimed as a model of national implementation of the CBD's mandate on GR access
regimes. The agreement between INBio and Merck, a transnational pharmaceutical
company, appears to be one of the most prominent GR access arrangements cited. See
Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D. Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting:Fulfilling the Mandate
of the Biodiversity Convention, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 725-30 (1995) (noting
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E. Peru
A member country in the Andean Community, 207 Peru is
renowned for its wealth of bioresources, numbering in the top eight in
biodiversity globally. 20 8 Peru ratified the CBD soon after it was
opened for adoption 20 9 and passed a law implementing it thereafterthe Law on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Biological
Diversity. 210 The Act focused on conservation issues and does not
specifically consider regulation of any GR access system. 211 It simply
recognized the role of the state as a party that might participate in
the GR access procedure 212 and places some conservation-based limits
on such access.

213

Peru did not establish a comprehensive legal framework on GR
access until the 1999 approval of the Decree to Regulate Access to

the amount of positive public relations and international media exposure that the
signing of the agreement generated for Costa Rica and INBio); Christopher J. Hunter,
Sustainable Bioprospecting: Using Private Contracts and InternationalLegal Principles
and Policies to Conserve Raw Medicinal Materials, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 129,
159-62 (1997) (specifically referring to the agreement as a "landmark contract" and
noting that INBio attracted international attention through the signing of the
agreement); McManis, supra note 142, at 270 (praising the agreement as a "seminal
example" of the type of sustainable bioprospecting access arrangement that countries
should be making more of); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The Biodiversity Convention and
Intellectual Property Rights: Conflict or Harmony?, 106 PAT. WORLD 27, 29 (1998),
available at http://www.oblon.com/media/index.php?id=203 ("Perhaps the most widely
publicized arrangement between a leading research-based pharmaceutical company
and a developing country providing access to its biological resources is the agreement
between Merck and a non-profit research and conservation organization in Costa
Rica-the Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad or more simply 'INBio."'); Safrin, supra
note 10, at 684 ("INBio's agreement with Merck is the most heralded and often-cited
bioprospecting agreement. It . . . inspired countries to include terms on access to
genetic resources in the Convention [Convention on Biological Diversity], as it served
as the primary example of the value of genetic resources and their money-making
potential.").
207.
The Andean Pact community includes five nations: Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. These countries are considered to "harbor the largest
proportion of the world's biological diversity." Chasek et al., supra note 50, at 34.
208.
See AmazingPeru.com, About Peru, http://www.amazingperu.com/peru/
aboutperu.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (providing general information regarding
Peru's biodiversity).
209.
Peru ratified the CBD on June 7, 1993. Convention on Biological Diversity,
List of Parties, http://www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
210.
Ley sobre la conservaci6n y aprovechamiento sostenible de la diversidad
biol6gica [Law on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Biological Diversity],
No. 26839 (1997) (Peru), available at http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/
Leyes/26839.pdf,
translation
available
at
http://www.lclark.edu/org/ielp/
peruenglish.html.
211.
Id. arts. 3, 4.
212.
Id. art. 28.
213.
Id. art. 29.
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Genetic Resources. 2 14 The Decree aimed to assist in the application
of Decision 391 of the Andean Common Regime on Access to Genetic
Resources. 215 The National Commission of Genetic Resources
(CONARGE), as a competent national authority, is bound to enforce
GR access regulations; 2 16 no party can obtain and use GR without a
2 17
resolution delivered by the Commission authorizing access.
In terms of PIC, the Peruvian decree adopts a multi-consent
system and pays due regard to the consent rights of indigenous
communities. The regulation does require the express consent of
indigenous populations 218 in whose territories GR are located. 2 19 A
summary of the access request must be published in the relevant
area, and any interested parties may submit their opinions to the
CNA within fifteen days. 220 Access applications to be reviewed by the
Authority must include an agreement between the communities and
applicants as an accessory contract. 221 Nevertheless, the Decree fails
to provide officials with any normative basis by which to facilitate or
assist the completion of such an agreement.
Upon the procurement of local consent, access applicants must
disclose information to the Authority, including the identification of
stakeholders such as the requester, GR providers, involved parties,
22 2
national support institutions, and responsible technical persons.
22 3
The applicants must submit a complete and detailed access project.
After reviewing the access project and relevant information, the
Authority may reject or approve the access in the form of a

214.
Bill to Regulate Access to Genetic Resources (1999) (Peru), translation
available at Lewis & Clark Law School, International Environmental Law Project,
http://www.lclark.edu/org/ielp/perubillenglish.html.
215.
See id. arts. 1, 2 ('The present Supreme Decree establishes the
complementary norms for the application of Decision 391 of the Commission of
Cartagena Agreement on the Common Regime of Access to the Genetic Resources.");
Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources, Andean Community, Decision 391,
July 2, 1996, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/normativa/
D391e.htm ("The purpose of this Decision is to regulate access to the genetic resources
of the Member Countries and their by-products ....").The regime provides a common
system for the Andean countries dealing with GR access issues. See Chasek et al.,
supra note 50, at 34 (noting that the regime proceeded from a perceived need for a
common system to increase control over the Andean countries' vast genetic resources);
Safrin, supra note 10, at 649-51 (especially pointing out the influence of the regime).
216.
Bill to Regulate Access to Genetic Resources, supra note 214, art. 29.
217.
Id. arts. 17-18.
218.
Id. art. 6. The term "indigenous populations" is defined more broadly in the
decree; it comprises "native communities, campesino [communities] and indigenous
communities." Id. art. 1.
219.
Id. art. 6(3).
220.
Id. art. 12.
221.
Id. art. 15. This provision also provides that such accessory contracts shall
not prejudice the access agreement between the State and the access requester. Id.
arts. 15, 21.
222.
Id. art. 11.
223.
Id.
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resolution. 224 If an access project is approved, the Authority issues a
resolution that perfects the access contract between the state and
access requester and authorizes access to GR. 225 According to Article

the
19 of the Decree, this resolution is equivalent to the PIC of
22 6 However, very few access projects have been approved. 227
state.
F. Australia
Australia has more biodiversity than most developed nations,
with 10% of the world's species. 228 Approximately 80% of Australia's
native species are not found naturally abroad. 229 Its government is a
federal system, consisting of the Federal Government and the eight
governments of states and territories. 230 "[Elach government
manages access to biological resources in its jurisdiction under its
own laws."23 1 At the federal level, the Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBCA) 232 constitutes the
premier legislative instrument for environmental and biodiversity
With respect to GR
matters in Commonwealth areas. 233

224.
Id. art. 17.
Id.
225.
Id. art 19.
226.
See GARFORTH ET AL., supra note 155, at 13-14 (suggesting that there is
227.
only one well-known Peruvian access agreement and a number of obstacles to the
signing of more such agreements).
228.
See Australian Government, Department of the Environment, Water,
Heritage and the Arts, Australia's Biological Resources, http://www.environment.
gov.aulbiodiversity/science/access/contacts/index.html (last visited Jan. 6,2009) (noting
that Australia is one of the few megadiverse areas of the world and that it contains
10% of the species found on Earth).
229.
Id.
The eight states and territories are New South Wales, Victoria,
230.
Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania, the Northern Territory,
and the Australian Capital Territory. See id. (providing a map and list of the eight
Australian states and territories, as well as the Australian external territories).
Id.
231.
232.
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999 (Austl.),
available at http://www.frli.gov.aulComLaw[Legislation/ActCompilationl.nsflO/C8E992
E70DE300F9CA2573050000E31C/$file/EnvProtBioDivCons99VollWD02.pdf.
233.
The Commonwealth areas of Australia include:
(a) land owned by the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth agency (including
land owned in Norfolk Island) and airspace over the land; (b) an area of land
held under lease by the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth agency (including
an area held under lease in Norfolk Island) and airspace over the land; (c) land
in: (i) an external Territory (except Norfolk Island); or (ii) the Jervis Bay
Territory; and airspace over the land; (d) the coastal sea of Australia or an
external Territory; (e) the continental shelf, and the waters and airspace over
the continental shelf; (f)the waters of the exclusive economic zone, the seabed
under those waters and the airspace above those waters; (g) any other area of
land, sea or seabed that is included in a Commonwealth reserve.
Id. § 525.
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management, Section 301 of the EPBCA, while reflecting the core
CBD mandates, simply outlines the framework for future regulations
234
on the control of access to biological resources.
As a result of a lengthy inquiry, a specific and detailed GR rule
was finalized in 2005.235 An amendment added a new Part 8A to the
existing Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation
Regulations under the EPBCA, establishing a thorough GR
23 6
regulatory regime.
Any person who intends to access bioresources in a
Commonwealth area must obtain a permit. 23 7 The law treats foreign
and domestic bioprospectors the same. Thus, a foreign person can
apply for the access permit alone.
The Genetic Resources
Management section of the Australian Department of the
Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (DEWHA)-the federal
238
CNA-is responsible for granting access permits.
The Australian federal access regime adopts a multiple-consent
system for GR access sought on indigenous land. With respect to GR
access for commercial purposes, the owner of the land or a native

234.
Section 301 of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation
Act 1999 reads:
(1) The regulations may provide for the control of access to biological resources
in Commonwealth areas. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), the regulations
may contain provisions about all or any of the following: (a) the equitable
sharing of the benefits arising from the use of biological resources in
Commonwealth areas; (b) the facilitation of access to such resources; (c) the
right to deny access to such resources; (d) the granting of access to such
resources and the terms and conditions of such access.
Id. § 301.
235.
See GARFORTH ET AL., supra note 155, at 23 (referencing the Environmental
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment Regulations 2005 (No. 2), which
came into force on December 1, 2005).
236.
See generally Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation
Amendment Regulations 2005 (No. 2), Select Legislative Instrument 2005 No. 251
(Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLawfLegislation/Legislative
Instrument .nsf0/9A4E98785AA5E3D2CA2570B9000F5A72/$file/MM10491A050823EV.pdf [hereinafter Australian Environment Protection Regulations].
237.
Id. § 8A.06.
238.
See Australian Government, Department of the Environment, Water,
Heritage and the Arts, Access to Biological Resources in Commonwealth Areas,
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/science/access/commonwealth/index.html
(last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (explaining that the Genetic Resources Management team
within the Parks Australia Division of the Department of the Environment, Water,
Heritage and the Arts manages access on most Commonwealth lands and that
normally the only way to access such lands is by obtaining a permit). The DEWHA has
also accredited the permit systems of other organizations, such as the Australian
Government's Antarctic Division and the Australian Institute of Marine Science.
Interview with Officials, Dep't of the Env't, Water, Heritage & the Arts, Austl. Govt, in
Canberra, Austl. (July 7, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with DEWHA Officials] (on file
with author).
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titleholder recognized as "access provider" 239 must give informed
consent.2 40 Like the Costa Rican access law, 24 1 the Australian rule
manages to ensure that PIC proceeds in a meaningful manner and
reaches a satisfactory result. The CNA must review the legitimacy of
any given informed consent by considering several matters, including
the knowledge of an access provider about the governing rules; the
capacity of the provider to engage in reasonable negotiations with
access applicants; the adequacy of time given to the access provider to
consider the application, to consult with relevant people, such as the
traditional owners of the land, and to negotiate the benefit-sharing
2 42
agreement; and independent legal advice about the application.
For noncommercial access, the procedure for obtaining a local PIC is
relatively simple and requires only a written permission from each
access provider. 243 In practice, the Australian authority works in
partnership with indigenous communities and is keen to assist in
244
their exercise of consent.
In assessing a permit application, upon its satisfaction that all
the PIC requirements have been met, the CNA may consult any
person 24 5 and will conduct an assessment of environmental impact 246
24 7
to reach a final decision on the permit.
Based upon the regulations, the Australian government takes
the approach of facilitating GR access and making the permit
application as simple as possible. 248 Since 2005, all applications have
been approved and around thirty permits issued for noncommercial

239.
In addition to the owner of indigenous people's land, most access providers
refer to "Commonwealth" or "Commonwealth agent." See Australian Environment
Protection Regulations, supra note 236, § 8A.04(1) (providing the definition of "access
provider").
240.
Id. § 8A.10(1).
241.
See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing PIC under

Costa Rican law).
242.
Australian Environment Protection Regulations, supra note 236, §
8A. 10(2).
243.
Id. § 8A.12(1).
244.
Interview with DEWHA Officials, supra note 238; see also Access to
Biological Resources in Commonwealth Areas, supra note 238 (stating that Australia
seeks to be a leader in the dynamic field of biodiscovery and, in partnership with
indigenous people, biotech companies, research scientists and managers of biodiversity,
the Australian, State and Territory Governments will ensure practices and advances in
biodiscovery are sustainable, inclusive and rewarding).
245.
Australian Environment Protection Regulations, supra note 236,
§ 8A.15(1).
246.
Id. § 8A.16.
247.
See id. § 17.03A(6) (mentioning other factors to be taken into account in
deciding whether to issue a permit, such as the fulfillment of the precautionary
principle).
248.
Interview with DEWHA Officials, supra note 238.
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purposes. 249 Four commercial benefit-sharing agreements have been
250
finalized and another three are currently under negotiation.
At the state and territory level, Queensland enacted its
Biodiscovery Act in 2004251 and the Northern Territory adopted the
Bioresources Act in 2006.252 In terms of supervising indigenous PIC,
the Northern Territory law provides the same content as the EPBC
Regulations. 253 The Northern Territory applies the facilitating
approach and has approved fifty-five applications for GR access on
non-indigenous lands since the inception of the Act. 254 Few access
255
projects have been rejected in the Territory.
To achieve coherent national GR management scheme between
governments, each of the nine Australian jurisdictions adopted the
Nationally Consistent Approach in 2002.256 The document states
general principles that underpin the development or review of
legislative, administrative, or policy frameworks in individual
regimes. 25 7 Nevertheless, some significant inconsistencies among the
25 8
current three access regimes remain.

249.
Id.
250.
Id.
251.
Biodiscovery
Act,
2004
(Queensl.)
(Austl.),
available
at
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTNICURRENT/B/BiodiscovAO4.pdf.
"The
purpose of the Act is achieved through a benefit sharing regime based on contractual
Benefit Sharing Agreements (administered by the Department of State Development)
and a permitting regime (administered by the Environmental Protection Agency)
involving a single Biodiscovery Collection Authority." Australian Government,
Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, Queensland,
http://www.environment.gov.aulbiodiversity/science/access/contacts/qld/index.html#stat
elands (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
252.
Biological Resources Act, 2006 (N. Terr.) (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.auaulegisnt/consolact/bra2006210/.
253.
Biological Resources Act § 28; Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Amendment Regulations, 2000, § 8A.10 (Austl.), available at
http:/www.austlii.edu.auau/legis/cthconsol-reg/epabcr2000697/s8a.1O.html.
The
difficulty in implementing the local PIC of the Act arises as to how to identify who the
exact owners of indigenous lands to be accessed are. Telephone Interview with
Officials, N. Terr. Gov't, Austl., in Canberra, Austl. (July 7, 2008) [hereinafter N. Terr.
Interview] (on file with author).
254.
N. Terr. Interview, supranote 253.
255.
Id.
256.
See NAT. RESOURCE MGMT. MINISTERIAL COUNCIL, NATIONALLY
CONSISTENT APPROACH FOR ACCESS TO AND THE UTILISATION OF AUSTRALIA'S NATIVE
GENETIC AND BIOCHEMICAL RESOURCES 4 (2002), available at http://www.environment.
gov.aubiodiversitylpublicationslaccess/ncapubslnca.pdf
(setting out the unified
approach that Australia's Governments have pledged to take towards national genetic
resource management).
257.
Id. at 5.
258.
An Australian Marine Biologist mentioned that access to or study of some
marine species with migratory nature will involve a variety of access jurisdictions in
Australia. He considered that the inconsistency among each access legislation would
cause uncertainty to a given access project that aims at taking the same bio-samples.
Therefore, he favors a single Australian GR access regime that would reduce the cost
and risk of applying for a permit. Interview with Joe Baker, Chief Scientific Advisor,
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In contrast to many GR-rich developing countries' practices, the
Australian system appears indicative of a nation embracing an open
policy toward GR access management.
259

G. Taiwan
1.

Rich Genetic Resources in Taiwan and Problems Resulting from
a Lack of Proper Regulation

Taiwan enjoys a reputation for abundant GR, although its
territory occupies only 0.03% of the Earth's total land mass. 260 There
are 5,000 native plant species in Taiwan that account for 2.1% of the
world's flora. 261 Taiwan's 29,000 animal species represent 3.4% of the
world's animal species; Taiwan has also more than 10,000 species of
262
microorganisms, accounting for 8.6% of the whole.
The wealth of bioresources in Taiwan has, of course, drawn the
attention of bioprospectors.
While many foreign individuals,
institutions, and companies have been exploring the GR of this island
for decades, no legal system has yet been formulated to regulate the
activities.263 Unfortunately, Taiwan has experienced a number of
difficulties due to unregulated, uncompensated bioprospecting in the
absence of proper regulation.

Dep't of Primary Indus. & Fisheries, Queensl. Gov't, in Canberra, Austl. (July 5, 2008)
(on file with author).
259.
The CBD regime has proved to be the most influential international
institution governing biological diversity mainly because most countries are
contracting parties and implement CBD mandates, especially regarding ABS elements.
There are two major nations which have yet to accede to the CBD. The U.S. chooses not
to join the regime. See Convention on Biological Diversity, List of Parties,
http://www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (showing that the
United Stated has signed the CBD, but is not a party to the CBD and has not ratified
it). Given the unique status of Taiwan, the country is currently not allowed to join most
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that generally require statehood as the
qualification for their membership. Since, as indicated above, the sovereign control of
GR specified in the CBD reflects customary international rule, Taiwan, as a subject of
the international communities irrespective of its disputed status, does enjoy
jurisdiction over its GR control. Taiwan's noncontracting party status to the CBD thus
cannot diminish the nation's capacity to engage in the building of a relevant ABS legal
system. It is also the Author's belief that no country would object to Taiwan's move to
control GR. See generally Kuei-Jung Ni, The Status of Taiwan in International
Environmental Law, 31 NAT'L TAIwAN U. L.J. 97 (2002) (providing a general review and
analysis of Taiwan's status in international environmental law).
260.
See WARREN H.J. KUO ET AL. EDS., ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING OF
GENETIC RESOURCES 36 (National Taiwan University, Department of Agronomy, 2005),
available at http://seed.agron.ntu.edu.tw/agrabook.htm.
261.
Id.
262.
Id.; Warren H.J. Kuo et al., Legalizing the Acquisition of Genetic Resources
in Chinese Taipei: A Proposal 1 (2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://seed.agron.ntu.edu.tw/agra/apecgrdraft.pdf [hereinafter Kuo et al., Legalizing
the Acquisition].
263.
KUO ET AL. EDS., supra note 260, at 38.
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For instance, Nothapodytes nimmoniana, used to treat colon
cancer, 264 provides a leading case. A Japanese company brought the
plant, a native species of an offshore island of Taiwan, to southern
Taiwan for cultivation upon discovery of its medicinal properties.
After extracting the compound camptothecin from the plant, the
company has successfully been awarded a number of patents
internationally. 265 With the exception of a few local farmers, Taiwan
has hardly benefited from the vast commercial exploitation of the
plant. 266 This instance of biopiracy was clearly facilitated by the lack
of GR regulation in the Taiwanese legal system.
2.

The Move to Regulate ABS on Genetic Resources: The State of
Play on PIC

International practice has produced two primary GR regulation
models. The first model, adopted by India, Costa Rica, and the
Philippines, is a formulation of a comprehensive biological diversity
law that echoes most of the CBD elements; naturally, GR access
control constitutes a part of the law. Some countries, however, opt for
a specific law covering GR access or GR management only; Brazil
pursued such an approach.
In 2001, the Executive Yuan of the Taiwanese government
adopted the Measure to Enforce Biological Diversity, calling for the
enactment of GR regulation. 26 7 The Taiwanese legal systems that
currently govern national parks, forests, wild animals, indigenous
peoples, and cultural asset preservation are not well suited to carry
out a general biodiversity law. 268 The complexity and expense
entailed in implementing such regulation have dissuaded decision
makers from enacting a comprehensive biodiversity law. 269
Therefore, a consensus has been reached to draft a specific law on GR
270
access.
During 2005, a drafting team comprised of legal and biological
professionals was organized and coordinated under the leadership of

264.
Anti-Cancer Ingredient Extracted in New Way, TAIPEI TIMES, Aug. 9, 2007,
at 2, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/08/09/
2003373315.
265.
See id. (explaining patents held by Japanese).
266.
See id. (explaining past inability of Taiwanese to exploit the remedy).
267.
2,747th Meeting of the Executive Yuan, Aug. 15, 2001, Biodiversity Action
Plan (Taiwan), available at http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/ecofhtml/part62.htm. The Council of Agriculture in 1998 had made a proposal to enact regulations on
GR access in Taiwan; see also KuO ET AL. EDS., supra note 260, at 39.
268.
KUO ET AL. EDS., supra note 260, at 39 (mentioning that the Taiwanese
laws relating to GR include National Park Law, Forest Law, Wild Animal Protection
Law, Indigenous People Protection Law, and Cultural Asset Preservation).
269. Id.
270. Id.
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Professor Kuo at National Taiwan University. 271 After intense
consultations and meetings, 272 the team produced a preliminary draft
focused on ABS regulation in late 2005.
Generally speaking, the draft, similar to those of India and
Brazil, foreign applicants cannot conduct bioprospecting without the
participation of local nationals. 2 73 Instead of establishing an agency,
the draft delegates competency over GR to Taiwan's Council of
Agriculture.27 4 The draft further requires all GR access applicants to
275
obtain permission from the Council.
In general, the draft distinguishes academic from commercial
bio-exploration. 276 It adopts a relatively open policy toward the
former, aimed at facilitating the GR access process.27 7 In contrast,
commercial applicants must fulfill the sound ABS requirements. 278
With respect to PIC, the draft favors a multiple-consent system to the
extent that a GR access project must obtain PIC from the following
stakeholders:
*
"

"

The competent body of the public land where the exercise of a
bioprospecting project occurs on public land;
The indigenous peoples in accordance with Indigenous Peoples'
Basic Law and relevant regulations where the exercise of a
bioprospecting project occurs on indigenous peoples' land;
The owner where the exercise of a bioprospecting project occurs on
279
private land.

Denial of consent by the above interested parties shall constitute one
2 80
of the conditions in rejecting an access application.
Taiwan's approach to PIC is similar to that of the Philippines
and Brazil. However, as the law remains in a drafting stage, it is
premature to say whether any anti-commons problem will occur.
Because the draft takes a comparatively relaxed attitude toward GR
access for academic bioresearch, the issue of anti-commons will likely
be avoided in those instances. It is, of course, fair to treat GR access
for pure research purposes and commercial purposes differently.
However, a policy that omits the PIC requirement for the former

271.
Genetic Resources Acquisition with Benefit Share, http://seed.agron.ntu.
edu.tw/agrabook.htm (last visited Jan.6, 2009).
272.
National Taiwan University Seed Lab, http://seed.agron.ntu.edu.tw (last
visited Jan. 6, 2009) (describing the proceedings of the meetings).
273.
The Draft on the Taiwanese Genetic Resources Act, Aug. 15, 2006, art. 6,
http://seed.agron.ntu.edu.tw/agra.htm (last visited Jan 6, 2009).
274.
Id. art. 3. The Council may consult with other organs when necessary. See
id. art. 13.
275.
Id. art. 8.
276.
Id. art. 4, 9.
277.
Id. art. 9, T 1.
278.
Id. art. 9, 2.
279.
See id. art. 27.
280.
Id. art. 23 (4).
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raises appropriate skepticism. Given that PIC is intended to preserve
the autonomy of stakeholders in participation and decision making,
their right to give consent should not be deprived even in the context
of GR access for the purpose of pure scientific research. Therefore,
the PIC requirement should be maintained in such cases. To avoid
imposing unnecessary burdens on academic applicants, the drafters
should consider allowing the competent agency to participate in the
PIC process or to mediate any disagreement between applicants and
the interested parties in such circumstances. To ensure that relevant
stakeholders exercise reasonable judgment in granting consent, the
drafters should also make detailed rules designed to ensure that GR
providers have sufficient information to decide whether to consent.

IV.

CRITICAL ISSUES OCCURRING IN PIC PRACTICE: OVERALL
ASSESSMENT AND SUGGESTIONS

A. The Role and Status of Indigenous Peoples in Access
to Genetic Resources
It is true that the plain language of the CBD does not establish a
clear and positive status for indigenous peoples with respect to
PIC. 28 1 The Bonn Guidelines do, however, recognize indigenous
peoples as relevant stakeholders whose involvement in the adequate
development and implementation of ABS arrangements is
essential. 28 2 The Guidelines also propose that relevant stakeholders
should be consulted. 283
To ensure effective participation of
stakeholders, national governments should provide information and
support for capacity building. 28 4 Regardless of their useful advice,
the Bonn Guidelines, due to their soft-law nature, are incapable of
protecting the status of indigenous peoples by obliging nations to
recognize fully the peoples' prerogative regarding PIC.285
The intimate linkage of indigenous peoples to the territories in
which GR exploration often occurs seems to justify their
indispensable role in giving consent and participating in the approval
process for GR bioprospecting. Jeffery correctly observes that:
These communities are custodians of these resources that form an
integral part of their beliefs, practices and cultural traditions. To
develop any legal framework that does not fully take into account the
needs, aspirations and concerns of these communities and the need to

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
binding).

CBD, supra note 1, art. 15(5).
Bonn Guidelines, supra note 33, 17.
Id.
19.
Id. 20.
See supra Part II (explaining that the Bonn Guidelines are not legally
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provide incentives will inevitably result in a failure with respect to
whatever environmental conservation measures are sought to be
286
imposed.

Not surprisingly, some authors are dissatisfied with current
national and international arrangements that give insufficient regard
to indigenous peoples' status in GR access initiatives occurring in
their home land. 28 7 In effect, the peoples might be deprived of the
right to decide whether to authorize GR access, irrespective of the
close relationship between their communities and the GR resources in
question.
Safrin identifies two sources of concern that recognizing robust
sovereign rights over GR might endanger the interests of local
peoples. First, she criticizes that the nationalization of genetic
material by states might lead to the suppression of local peoples'
will.28 8 Thus, given the relatively weak status of indigenous peoples
in certain countries, upon encountering a conflict over GR access
approval between indigenous peoples and governments, some states
may override the wishes of the peoples that disapprove of the project
in order to serve their own interest. 28 9 Second, though states do not
claim exclusive ownership of GR, Safrin further singles out India and
Brazil's practices of centralized GR access control 290 as instances of
"paternalism" and suggests that such policies "diminish[] the ability
of individual and indigenous communities to control the genetic
''29 1
resources in question for themselves.
Any national consent policy that ignores the autonomy and
interests of indigenous peoples should be regarded with skepticism.
This lack of concern for indigenous peoples is also contrary to recent
developments in international law, and the normative position of
these peoples in international law informs this discussion to a large
extent.
Indeed, since the creation of the United Nations (UN), the
international community has formulated numerous documents to
uphold the status of indigenous people. 292 To some extent, the
human rights approach adopted by the instruments may help

286.
Jeffery, supranote 4, at 791.
287.
See, e.g., Safrin, supra note 10, at 658-63 (discussing the risks that
indigenous communities face under sovereign ownership or control of GR).
288.
Safrin points out that Colombian law may fit the category, but states that
no real incidents reflect such a scenario. Id. at 658.
289.
Id.
290.
Although the practices of those countries may neglect the interests of local
peoples, they also avoid the possible flaw of adopting a multi-consent system of PIC
that may unreasonably veto GR access applications in local territory. Safrin considers
the multi-consent system may create an anti-commons problem. Id. at 653.
291.
Id. at 659.
292.
See Kuei-Jung Ni, The National Park vs. Indigenous Peoples: The Yami's
Practicein the ROC on Taiwan, 9 SOOCHOW L. REV. 45, 47-55 (1996).
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strengthen the legitimate position of indigenous peoples with regard
to PIC and GR access. In particular, the works of the International
Labor Organization (ILO) are perhaps the leading instruments in
favoring the status of indigenous peoples in each nation whenever
any policy or decision making stands to affect their lives and
traditions. 293
There is much evidence to support the existence of a strong
connection between the cultural practices of indigenous peoples and
the natural resources surrounding them. 294 Given this exceptional
relationship, it would be irrational to neglect their opinions as to
whether GR access in their land is permissible. Further, upon full
confirmation of an indigenous right of ownership or entitlement to the
territory and natural resources, there are persuasive grounds from
which to uphold their consent right for GR access. 295 In fact, a
number of international documents are inclined to promote
indigenous peoples' rights to the native lands and natural resources
adjacent them. For instance, the 1989 ILO Convention Concerning
the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (No.
169),296 a progressive improvement upon its previous work in the
1957 Convention (No. 107),297 requires governments to take steps as
necessary to identify the lands traditionally occupied and to
guarantee effective protection of those individuals' rights of
ownership and possession.2 98 The treaty also proclaims the rights of
people interested in the safeguarding of the natural resources
299
pertaining to their lands.

293.
See generally International Labor Organization (ILO), Introduction to ILO
Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, http://www.ilo.org/public/
englishlregion/ampro/mdtsanjose/indigenous/introl69.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2009)
(summarizing ILO goals and actions to ensure that governments respect the rights of
indigenous peoples and that indigenous people are able to participate in decision
making and policies that affect them).
294.
Asbjorn Eide, United Nations Action on Rights of Indigenous Populations,

in THE RIGHTS

OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS ON

SELF-DETERMINATION 24 (Ruth Thompson ed., 1983).
295.
See PATRICIA LUCIA CANTUARIA MARIN, PROVIDING PROTECTION FOR PLAN
GENETIC RESOURCES: PATENTS, SuI GENERIS SYSTEMS, AND BIOPARTNERSHIPS 107

(2002) (advocating application of "prior informed consent" requirement to indigenous
peoples' control over outside access to genetic resources in their rightfully-owned native
lands).
296.
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries (I.L.O. No. 169), June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 [hereinafter ILO Convention
No. 169].
297.
Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and
Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (I.L.O. No. 107),
June 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247. One of the major modifications by the latter
Convention No. 169 is that No. 169 aims to remove the assimilationist or integrationist
orientation of the earlier standards. ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 296, pmbl.
298.
ILO Convention No. 169, supranote 296, art. 14.
299.
Id. art. 15.
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UN efforts to promote and protect the rights of indigenous
peoples cannot be overemphasized. The most significant contribution
of the UN to date is to conclude the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Human Rights Council in
2006,30°a document that was subsequently adopted by the UN
General Assembly in September 2007.301 The Declaration was the
result of several decades of negotiations based on a previous product
of the Working Group on Indigenous Population, a draft Universal
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 3 02 Echoing the
ILO's document, the UN Declaration also recognizes the close
relationship between indigenous peoples and their traditionally
owned or occupied lands, territories, and resources. 30 3 In effect, their
30 4
right to own, use, develop, and control the areas has been affirmed.
From another point of view, it may be safe to say that whether
indigenous peoples enjoy a definite right of consent over GR
exploration hinges on what role they play in the making of decisions
and policy affecting their lives. International society has taken
seriously the issues of full participation of indigenous peoples in the
dominant society and of true power sharing. 30 5 The ILO Convention
No. 169 (ILO Convention) responds to such needs of indigenous
peoples, considerably strengthening their rights with respect to
measures that impact them. 30 6 Article 6 of the Convention provides
that concerned peoples should be consulted, through their
or
to legislative
with
regard
institutions,
representative
administrative measures affecting them, and that they should
participate at all levels of decision making on issues that concern
them. 30 7 Article 7 further recognizes the right of people to decide

300.
On June 29, 2006, the Human Rights Council of the UN adopted the
Declaration, and recommended it to the General Assembly for final adoption. U.N.
Hum. Rts. Council, Report to the General Assembly on the First Session of the Human
Rights Council, at 57, U.N. Doc. A/HRD/lJL.10 (June 30, 2006).
301.
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration]. The U.N.
Declaration was adopted by a majority of 144 states in favor, with 4 votes against
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) and 11 abstentions
(Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria,
Russian Federation, Samoa, and Ukraine). See Office of the United Nations High
Commissioners for Human Rights, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm (last visited Jan. 6,
2009).
302.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on Its Forty-Sixth Session, at 103, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (Oct. 28, 1994).
303.
U.N. Declaration, supra note 301, art. 25.
304.
Id. art. 26.
See Eisa Stamatopoulou, Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations:
305.
Human Rights as a Developing Dynamic, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 58, 75 (1994).
ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 296, arts. 3, 6.
306.
307.
Id. art. 6.
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their own priorities for the development process as it affects their
lives, beliefs, institutions, spiritual well-being, and the lands upon
30 8
which they dwell or otherwise use.
Like the ILO Convention, the UN Declaration also confirms
these privileges of indigenous peoples. In particular, Article 19 of the
Declaration incorporates the concept of PIC,30 9 explicitly obliging
states to engage in consultation and cooperation with the peoples
concerned in order to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent
before adopting any official measures affecting them. 3 10 Further,
their right to participate, to be consulted, to give consent, and to
determine is reiterated in Article 32, which specifically deals with
projects affecting their domain and resources, such as development
and utilization or exploitation of their mineral, water, or other
resources. 311 Of course, such resources should include GR. In terms
of PIC and GR access, the provision literally could be the clearest and
most powerful ground on which to establish such right of indigenous
peoples.
In concluding the discussion of these documents, the great
contributions of both the ILO and UN to the promotion of rights of
indigenous peoples deserve recognition. Their efforts have been
heavily referenced by commentators in order to sustain the essential
status of indigenous peoples in the implementation of the Convention
312
on Biological Diversity PIC requirement for GR access.
From a rigid legal perspective, however, some remain skeptical
of the validity of the international documents mentioned above and
doubt whether they lay such a solid foundation for indigenous
peoples' status with respect to a biodiversity regime. 3 13 They argue
that the weakness of the ILC Convention arises from its scarce
endorsement by countries with indigenous populations 3 14 and the
315
limited contribution of indigenous representatives to its drafting.
Moreover, the text of the CBD deliberately weakens the status of
indigenous peoples by "avoid[ing] the use of either the terms 'rights'

308.
Id. art. 7.
309.
In addition to articles 19 and 32, a number of provisions of the U.N.
Declaration reflect and integrate the idea of PIC, such as articles 10, 11(2), and 29(2).
U.N. Declaration, supra note 301, arts. 10, 11(2), 29(2).
310.
U.N. Declaration, supra note 301, art. 19; see also ILO Convention No. 169,
supra note 296, art. 16 (requiring prior consent of indigenous peoples).
311.
U.N. Declaration, supranote 301, art. 32.
312.
See MARIN, supra note 295, at 107 n.123, 108 n.127; see also Aguilar, supra
note 189, at 178-79.
See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 18, at 580 (discussing the ambiguous
313.
language of international documents).
Id. at 579.
314.
315.
See Stamatopoulou, supra note 305, at 66. ("[Alt the International Labor
Organization forum almost every article of Convention 169 was voted on and the
participation of indigenous representatives during the elaboration of the new treaty
was poor.").
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or 'peoples,"' and by not defining the peoples concerned. 316 Birnie and
Boyle thus conclude that "[t]he ambiguous language of the Preamble
and Article 80) arises from the fact that international law on
indigenous peoples and protection of their environment remains
317
controversial."
Given the uncertainty of the status of indigenous peoples in
international law, particularly concerning their rights to nearby
genetic resources,3 18 it seems that nations do not yet have a definite
obligation to recognize a positive right of indigenous peoples to give
consent. It may thus be hard to denounce some countries' policies,
such as those of India and Brazil, 3 19 on grounds that they negate the
right of indigenous peoples to consent in a GR access process.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that, in contrast to the CBD and
Bonn Guidelines, the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples reflects a relatively novel determination of the
international community to protect and promote the rights of
indigenous peoples. More importantly, the concept of PIC has been
explicitly incorporated into the Declaration, which may strengthen
the legitimacy of recognizing indigenous peoples' PIC rights. Of
course, the current CBD that has failed to formally confirm any
definite consent right of indigenous peoples prevails over the U.N.
Declaration, a non-binding document. However, regardless of the
form of soft international law, it is possible that the UN agenda of
promoting the human rights of indigenous peoples will inspire or
influence the future development of GR access regimes, either in the
3 20
CBD or in national practices.
B. The Multi-Consent System of PIC: Troubled Water? and the
Problem of Anti-Commons
Under international law, states enjoy the discretion to adopt
either a single- or multiple-consent system of PIC. According to
certain aforementioned national laws, local interested parties, like
indigenous peoples, are able to share the right of consent to GR
access. In effect, national authority would not authorize GR
321
explorations without the approval of the stakeholders.

BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 18, at 579.
316.
Id.
317.
318.
Id. at 580.
See discussion supra Parts III.A-B (explaining that neither the CBD nor
319.
the Bonn Guidelines explicitly recognize the consent right of indigenous peoples).
320.

See generally MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-

52 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that even legally non-binding resolutions of international
organizations could be relied on by international tribunals and that the documents may
harden into customary international law).
As indicated above, a number of national practices, like the Philippines,
321.
Costa Rica, and Australia, adopt the system. See discussion supra Part III (discussing
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However, the multi-consent system evokes criticism regarding its
lack of efficiency and related problems. Sometimes the lengthy
process to obtain the consent of local communities can discourage
applicants from applying to access GR in that area. For example, to
some extent, the Philippine law that adopts an extremely complicated
and multi-layered consent process has hindered the attempts of
322
foreign bioprospectors to seek GR access there.
Moreover, even if local peoples and identities agree, such consent
cannot guarantee the ultimate permission of authorities because the
final decision for any bioprospecting project may hinge on other
considerations. 323 Thus, costly efforts to win local support may be in
vain due to a contrary political decision.
It is true that some experience has underlined unpleasant events
owing to the failures of multi-consent PIC schemes. The collapse of
the ICBG-Maya project 32 4 in Mexico is an infamous failure of multiconsent system. 325 Indeed, the ICBG (International Cooperative
Biodiversity Group) was willing to follow the CBD's PIC
requirement 26 and made every attempt to secure the approval of the
Mayan people. 327 After nearly two years of consultation and
communication, 328 local ethical groups finally consented to the
project. 329 Nevertheless, NGOs, mainly the Rural Advancement
Foundation International (RAFI, now known as ETC Group) 330 and

the international movement to respect and recognize the right of indigenous peoples to
participate in decision-making regarding GR exploration that will affect their lives).
322.
Although a very small portion of bioprospecting applications were finally
approved in the Philippines, the national practice there fully respects and protects the
rights of local peoples to consent to GR access. See Safrin, supra note 10, at 660
(discussing the access-restricting regime utilized in the Philippines).
323.
Costa Rica Decree, supra note 202, art. 14 (providing that the Technical
Office will consider public interest criteria, including development options for the
future generations, food security, ecosystems conservation, and human health in the
evaluation or approval of the application)
324.
See International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups (ICBG), http://www.fic.
nih.gov/programs/research-grants/icbg/index.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2009). The ICBG
was initiated by the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), aiming to integrate
improvement of human health through drug discovery, creation of incentives for
conservation of biodiversity, and promotion of scientific research and sustainable
economic activity that focuses on environment, health, equity, and democracy. Id.
325.
See Safrin, supra note 10, at 655-57 (discussing the failure of the ICBGMaya project).
326.
Preston Hardison, ICBG-Maya: A Case Study in Prior Informed Consent,
IBIN NEWSLETTER, Nov. 2000, available at http://www.cbin.ec.gc.calbulletinsnewsletters/16.cfm?lang-eng.
327.
Safrin, supra note 10, at 656.
328.
Id.
329.
Id. (stating that nearly fifty Mayan communities expressed their consent to
the project and forty-six communities agreed to participate in the project); Hardison,
supra note 326, at 1.
330.
ETC Group (Action Group on Erosion, Technology, and Concentration) is an
international non-governmental organization (NGO) and was known as the Rural
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the Consejo de Medicos- y Parteras Indigenas Tradicionales de
Chiapas (Council of Traditional Indigenous Doctors and Midwives
from Chiapas) (COMPITCH), strongly opposed the project for several
reasons. 331 First of all, they disagreed that the ICBG had finalized
the local PIC process. 332 Even though the ICBG never consulted with
most of the local Mayan communities, RAFI and COMPICH
complained that the group failed to obtain the consent from the
traditional community assemblies of the Mayan people. 333 Further,
they considered the information provided by the ICBG to be
insufficient, as the group did not disclose detailed information about
future treatment and handling of genetic information being
collected.3 34 Although neither RAFI nor COMPICH were entitled to
officially participate in the GR review process in Mexico, it was
obvious that their objections proved so influential that the permission
335
for the ICBG project was blocked.
However, it seems unfair to contend that the undesirable
outcome of the project should be fully attributed to the exercise of a
multi-consent system. Instead, the international community should
learn from the story to avoid a repeat of the incident.
The
disappointing conclusion to the process for foreign bioprospectors was
actually a result of the lack of PIC regulations. The relevant Mexican
law simply provided that "PIC shall be obtained from the legal
possessor of the land where sample collecting takes place"; 336 it failed
to define which local entity should be informed and who has the right
to give consent, nor did it specify what information the applicants
were to disclose. 3 37 The normative vacancy and ambiguity created
the uncertainty that ignited conflicting views on the PIC regime

Advancement Foundation International (RAFI) prior to September 2001. ETC Group,
www.etcgroup.org (last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (see "About ETC" section for basic
description of activities and "History" section under "About ETC" for description of
organization's name change).
331.
See Hardison, supra note 326, at 1 (explaining that the ICBG-Maya project
has come under attack by RAFI and COMPITCH).
332.
Id.
333.
Id.
334.
They worried that "[g]enetic information.., held in confidentiality by one
of the ICBG-Maya partners, could become the unregulated property of another
company, should the partner ever sell its assets." Id.
335.
See Safrin, supra note 10, at 656-57 (explaining that, due to objections by
these groups, the bioprospecting permit did not issue).
336.
Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y la Protecci6n al Ambiente
[L.G.E.E.P.A.] [1988 General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental
Protection], as amended, arts. 87, 87-BIS, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 28 de
enero de 1988 (Mex.); see Jorge Larson-Guerra et al., Mexico: Between Legality and
Legitimacy, in ACCESSING BIODIVERSITY AND SHARING THE BENEFITS: LESSONS FROM
IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 123, 128-30 (Santiago
Carrizosa et al. eds., 2004), available at http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/EPLP054.pdf.

337.

Jorge Larson-Guerra et al., supra note 336, at 128-30.
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among relevant stakeholders. The dispute between ICBG, RAFI, and
COMPICH could have been avoided by clearly delineating the rules of
the game. Accordingly, it has become an urgent task for the Mexican
government to engage in lawmaking and a capacity-building process
so as to fill the normative vacuum and rectify this issue.
The time-consuming process and a variety of complicating factors
challenge bioprospecting applicants to predict the final decision of
The risk and cost of a negative
multiple-consent PIC regimes.
decision may be too high and ultimately unaffordable for some
potential applicants. However, it appears unrealistic to expect all GR
access applications to be approved as long as the final authorization
remains at the discretion of national government. GR users must
realize this and accept the risk of rejection by GR providers while
navigating the GR access system.
C. Reshaping the Function and Role of Competent NationalAuthority
It is quite obvious that international normative structures such
as the CBD, as well as national practices, have confirmed the central
role of a CNA in a GR access regime. In effect, national governments
remain the dominant consent givers for many bioprospecting
Irrespective of continuing complaints regarding
applications.
sovereign control over GR resources, it is difficult to reverse the
prerogative of governments. As Jeffery explains:
National states will continue to play a pivotal role with respect to the
development of any international legal framework regulating the access
and use of genetic resources due to the fact that it is the States, which
retain both sovereignty and responsibility for conserving biodiversity
within their jurisdiction. It is primarily for this reason that the
implementation of the CBD has devolved upon that nation states and
their sovereignty over these resources will necessarily determine the
effectiveness of any access and benefit sharing arrangements including
338
the enforcement aspects associated with these arrangements.

As the role of a CNA can hardly be replaced, it will serve the best
interests of all GR stakeholders for respective governments to
manage GR access mechanisms in a transparent, impartial, and
effective manner.
First, states should be constantly reminded that they are both
the guardians and trustees of GR. The control and management of
GR is not only a sovereign right but also a responsibility to promote
the public interest. National governments must accept that such a
task mandates that they strike a proper balance among the
conflicting interests of all interested parties, including bioprospecting
researchers or applicants, national conservation organs, local

338.

Jeffery, supra note 4, at 791-92.
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communities and indigenous peoples, and NGOs. Aguilar correctly
observes that "the developing countries must work on ways of acting
as the 'guardians' of biodiversity at the place where these genetic
resources are located and of creating 'tools' that will allow them to
define the rights and obligations of the different actors involved with
'339
respect to access to genetic resources.
Second, it would be utterly irresponsible for governments to
leave a PIC process to be handled by local peoples in countries that
recognize the consent of local groups as a prerequisite for the final
authorization of a GR project. The role of a CNA as a capacity builder
as proposed by the CBD and Bonn Guidelines is essential. 340
Authorities must assist and educate local peoples in exercising
rational judgment on a GR proposal so as to give a meaningful
consent or a rejection in order to avert any unreasonable veto on GR
access. As a result, the multi-consent system could be run in a
manner that reduces the anti-commons effect.
In addition, governments could play an even more constructive
role. Firestone suggests that governments assume the role of an
intermediary in the form of an active negotiating agent or passive
supervisor:
An agent would negotiate on the community's behalf and facilitate a
PIC process. Such a body should have the necessary technical and legal
capacity, as well as great familiarity and accountability with local
communities. A supervising body could observe negotiations and PIC,
and provide support as necessary. Such a body might provide a
safeguard for abuse and intimidation, without running the risk of
imposing its own practices and views on communities. Such a
supervising body might also facilitate PIC by housing information on
the structure and practices of both communities and access-seekers and
341
could be the first recourse for complaints, questions, or concerns.

The Costa Rican and Australian access regimes exemplify such a
34 2
role.
Third, the interest of bioprospectors should be properly
safeguarded. In particular, a government should not abuse its right
of PIC as so to deliberately exclude a reasonable request for GR
access, especially from foreign bioprospectors. For instances when
local communities have consented but CNAs reject a request, the
relevant authority should create an appeal mechanism by which
applicants may seek modification of the decision and redress.
Finally, international supervision over CNAs should be
established. The CBD has not yet created a suitable mechanism to
monitor the national operation of PIC. But is expected to formulate a

339.
340.
341.
342.
Australian

Aguilar, supranote 189, at 175 (emphasis added).
Bonn Guidelines, supra note 33, 20.
Firestone, supra note 53, at 203.
See discussion supra Part III.D, F (explaining how the Costa Rican and
access laws ensure that PIC proceeds in a meaningful manner).
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device to supervise this activity. A dispute-settlement system should
be established to provide a remedy for foreign GR users whose
bioprospecting applications have been unreasonably denied. The
designated international ABS regime should be competent to
undertake this duty, although its mandate has not yet been
3 43
settled.

V. CONCLUSION

A strong voice against the national and international trends of
delegating full control of GR access to state governments has yet to
diminish. The consolidation of a decision making mechanism for
national authorities could be also problematic and may create
unsatisfactory results. Nonetheless, international law has squarely
confirmed the right of states to regulate access to their genetic
Further, practically speaking, the role of a CNA is
resources.
essential in a GR management regime. To prevent abuse of the
national prerogative, the imminent question facing the international
community is how to ensure transparency and fairness for GR access
and hold each national authority accountable for regulating
bioprospecting activities under their jurisdiction.
It was certainly a wise political decision to incorporate PIC in the
Convention on Biological Diversity's ABS regime as a means to
In terms of
safeguard national GR from misappropriation.
distribution of PIC rights in the national legal system, it remains at
the discretion of states to adopt either a single- or multiple-consent
system. The national legal arrangements and practices reviewed in
this Article reveal discrepancies in the national implementation of
PIC. Of course, it is not the intention of the CBD to unify national
practices, and states should be allowed to decide the detailed
operation of a PIC system at national and local levels. Although
national government remains the eventual access granter, it is by no
means the intention of the CBD to allow states to monopolize PIC
without regard for the interests of parties whose lives would be
affected by bioprospecting.
In contrast to the notion of informed consent in medical
treatment, PIC in national GR access management appears to be
more complicated and normally involves a variety of local
stakeholders, especially indigenous peoples. Their will and opinions
should be properly respected in reviewing access projects, even
though they may not be entitled to enjoy the consent right under
their respective legal systems.

343.
for GR).

See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing ideas for a regime to govern ABS

278

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:227

A multiple-consent system is likely to result in some
unsatisfactory results.
Such issues highlight the exigency and
importance of building a good practice in securing local PIC so that
the abuse or misuse of the consent right by local peoples to some
extent can be mitigated or avoided. National governments should
ensure that PIC givers have sufficient capacity to perform their right;
they must be fully informed so as to make a reasonable decision on
their consent.
While recognizing the PIC rights of contracting parties, the CBD
has yet to impose any obligation upon states regarding PIC operation.
The Bonn Guidelines, as indicated above, do formulate some
principles of legal certainty and clarity, economy, and transparency
for a PIC system, but they are not legally binding. The unbridled use
of the system by a state government could harm foreign
bioprospectors and conflict with the objectives of the CBD.
In
formulating a fair and effective supervision mechanism, the CBD
should ensure that national implementation of PIC is in conformity
with the aims and objectives of the CBD. Ideally, the currently
proposed international regime on ABS should fulfill the goal and
undertake the duty. Unfortunately, the substance of the present
draft appears inclined to protect and enforce sovereign control of GR.
To reach a proper balance of rights and obligations, future drafts
should include a mechanism to oversee the national exercise of
jurisdiction as to GR access and to ensure that the access regulatory
regime is managed in good faith.
The evolution of the PIC practice reveals the dynamic interplay
between national norm building and global regulatory construction.
The interaction and mutual supportiveness of these processes will be
instrumental in formulating an optimal, mature, and credible PIC
regime that is necessary to protect the interests of all GR
stakeholders.

